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Abstract: This study examines stock market reaction to the announcement of various forms
of seasoned issues in China. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that market reactions differ
in ways that suggest a difference between management’s internal assessment and the market’s
assessment of the stock price. The market responds unfavourably to the announcement, notably
in the case of rights issues and also with regard to open offers. Private placements experience
an unfavourable pre-announcement reaction, which contrasts with the favourable reaction
after the event. Convertible bond issues generate positive excess returns consistent with the
market’s confidence that they can help to align management and shareholders’ interests.
Further investigation shows that market reaction is related to factors specific to the issuer and
issue by reference to the period immediately surrounding the issue. Specifically, ownership
concentration, agency matters connected with equity offerings, investor protection connected
with fund allocation and security pricing, and the influence of powerful moneyed interests
together provide an instructive insight into market reaction. Institutional inefficiency pertaining
to underwriting, auditing, analysts’ forecasts and credit ratings are found to have a weak
association with market price, consistent with due public scepticism concerning management
and their gatekeepers.
Keywords: seasoned issues, seasoned equity offerings, convertible bond issues, market reaction,
information, information asymmetry, agency costs, market infrastructure, China
1. INTRODUCTION
Previous studies have examined the firm’s financing decisions and the corresponding
market price movements. Differences in price behaviour appear to depend mainly
on the available information pertaining to forms of financing and the perceptions of
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the market with respect to the firm’s financing decisions (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
Within the body of theory, several studies have considered the market implications
of securities issues to new as opposed to existing investors, and also the types of
issues that are subject to different degrees of regulatory discipline, obligations and
incentives (Baker and Wurgler, 2000; Carlson et al., 2006; DeAngelo et al., 2010; Silva
and Bilinski, 2015; and Hovakimian and Hu, 2016).
Information asymmetries impinge forcefully in terms of the signals conveyed
when securities are issued. The theory of information asymmetries posits that if
managers seek to maximize their existing shareholders’ wealth, shares will be offered
to the existing owners only when the management believe that the firm’s equity is
undervalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984; and Jenter et al., 2011). The price pressure
hypothesis suggests that an unexpected equity issue may also drive down the price
by signalling that the firm must make up for a shortfall in unobservable cash flow
from operations (Fama and French, 2006; Slovin et al., 2000; and Intintoli and Kahle,
2010). The wealth transfer hypothesis proposes that an unexpected issue of equity
reduces the risk of the firm’s outstanding debt leading to a wealth transfer from
shareholders to bondholders with a net value loss for shareholders (Masulis, 1983;
and Elliott et al., 2009). The above foci of discussion have helped to generate interest
in the comparative market reaction to the different forms of security issuance (e.g.,
Barnes and Walker, 2006).
In the case of open offers, a management which favours existing shareholders over
new potential shareholders has an incentive to issue equity when shares are overvalued,
especially when the firm goes public in a hot market (Gomes, 2001; and Alti, 2006).
Issuing new shares increases the number of outsider shares, diluting the ownership
stake and aggravating the potential conflict between managers and outside investors,
and thereby constraining firm value accordingly (Ginglinger et al., 2012). These
impacts are less likely to occur if ownership is already highly concentrated (Slovin
et al., 2000; and Holderness, 2009).
In contrast to open offers, private placements are typically offered to a group of
sophisticated investors whose certification amounts to a positive signal by way of a
quality seal (Wruck, 1989; and Chakraborty and Gantchev, 2013), mitigating under-
valuation problems, and averting the negative signals of public offerings (Hertzel and
Smith, 1993; and Wang, 2012). They may, however, be vulnerable to agency problems
associated with ownership concentration especially when ownership is already low
(Wruck, 1989).
In the case of rights issues, take-up can guard against ownership dilution or
wealth transfer to new shareholders. Hence, rights issues circumvent the agency costs
associated with open offerings by mitigating the impact of asymmetric information
problems and lowering transaction costs (Miller and Rock, 1985; Attig et al., 2006; and
Fama and French, 2006).
Unlike the securities discussed above, convertible bonds entail contractual disci-
plines and constraints. These can serve to allay market concerns that arise in respect
of other forms of issuance, militating against asset substitution and adverse selection
problems associated with plain equity sales (Myers and Majluf, 1984; and Stein, 1992).
Empirical evidence on price effects of equity issues was seminally analysed by
Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995). Subsequently, a
number of other studies have extensively examined mature markets such as the US
(Gao and Ritter, 2010; Henry and Koski, 2010; Alti and Sulaeman, 2012; and Bradley
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and Yuan, 2013), the UK (Slovin et al., 2000; Capstaff and Fletcher, 2011; Iqbal et al.,
2013; Armitage et al., 2014; and Silva and Bilinski, 2015), France (Ginglinger et al.,
2012), Spain (Martı´n-Ugedo, 2003; and Alvarez and Gonzalez, 2005), Japan (Suzuki
and Yamada, 2012), Australia (Lamberto and Rath, 2010), and others. Most of the
recent studies in this area of research have been encouraged to a large extent by
the increased interest in equity issues worldwide. It has been argued that reduced
transaction costs and the globalisation of finance have encouraged firms to acquire
equity finance in global financial markets (Kim andWeisbach, 2008). Research interest
has been further stimulated by recent periods of the marked unpopularity of equity
issues. This has occurred notably since 2000 both in the US and in Europe due, inter
alia, to a tendency to favour merger as a means of rapid growth, and also because of
low market valuation of companies after the collapse of the technology bubble and an
increasingly onerous burden of regulation (Craig et al., 2010; and Gao et al., 2013).
In recent years, security issuance in emerging markets has also attracted research
attention (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Chen and Yuan, 2004; Cheng et al., 2006; Ahmad-
Zaluki et al., 2007; Chen and Wang, 2007; and Luo et al., 2010). Findings differ
distinctly across markets as well as overall between emerging and mature settings,
especially when marked differences exist in respect of institutional and operational
arrangements. These differences engender issues based on reputation, relationships
and public policy in supporting financing channels particularly when market maturity
is an aspiration (Allen et al., 2005). China is a notable example here, due to its global
importance and the evolving nature of its capital markets.
The salient characteristics of security issuance in China are consonant with the
country’s evolving social, economic andmarket status as well as the pervading presence
of powerful influential groups. The research takes due cognisance of important
cultural influences which impinge on market mechanisms. All note agency problems
consistent with an underdeveloped institutional infrastructure that is deficient in
safeguards against informational asymmetries leading to security mispricing, the
deliberate distortion of earnings, and the manipulation of the dividend profile in the
period immediately surrounding security offerings. These abuses can operate to the
detriment of minority investors and other outsiders. For instance, in the case of rights
issues and open offers, the influence of agency costs associated with state ownership
comes to bear. In the case of private placements, there are clearly visible signs of both
manipulation of issue price in the run-up to the issue by the dominant controlling
shareholders and also a propensity to post-issue overinvestment (e.g., Yu et al., 2006).
While acknowledging the progress of the literature on security issuance, there
remains scope for a further investigation and comparison of the distinct influences
that come into play with different methods of issuance. Early work typically focuses
on a single method of issuance for predicting market movements following the
announcement without exploring the relative implications of a range of issuance
methods for investors. A number of studies explore specific types of issue, for instance
open offers (e.g., Slovin et al., 2000; and Barnes and Walker, 2006), rights offers (e.g.,
Martı´n-Ugedo, 2003), private placements (e.g., Barclay et al., 2007) and convertible
bonds (e.g., de Jong et al., 2011; and Lewis and Verwijmeren, 2014). However, these fall
short of offering a comparative perspective of the range of influence on market price
exercised by the different methods of issuance. Control and discipline matters should
be taken into account, including management’s ex-ante issue motives and decisions
associated with different methods of issuance.
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Earlier studies tend to confine themselves to a somewhat limited set of determi-
nants. They give insufficient weight, if any, to the characteristics and perspectives
of an issue, issuer and investors (e.g., Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2005; and Rantapuska
and Knupfer, 2008). It is necessary to acquiesce in a wide and inter-connected
range of factors, paying due attention to the nature of the issue itself, the financial
characteristics and outlook of the issuer, and the features specific to each type of
security issuance.
Our analytic design differs significantly from previous studies. We provide fresh
insights by extending previous work concerned with market price movement sur-
rounding a single type of seasoned issuance to an examination of all four types of
seasoned issuance in China. Through our study, we seek to produce insights into an
emerging market’s progress towards greater efficiency and completeness as well as
into factors that both advance and retard such progress. With respect to the context of
seasoned issuance, we consider the extent to which the activities of influential market
monitors and financial infrastructure builders are reflected in market reaction.
The above account of the scope of our work leads to the following formal research
questions: (1) how does the market react to the different forms of seasoned issues?;
and (2) which factors most powerfully explain the reactions we observe?
In approaching our research questions, we firstly examine how the market reacts
across the range of methods of seasoned issuance and their potential determinants by
reference to 1,810 seasoned issues in China from 1991 to 2010 inclusive. We explore
the relative impact of open offers, rights issues, private placements and convertible
bond issues, and compare the demonstrated preferences of new as opposed to existing
investors. We also compare distinguishing influences that have a bearing on individual
features of different forms of issuance which are subject to more as opposed to
less regulatory discipline, obligations and incentives. Our comparison enables us to
observe the play of agency influences in a marketplace whose imperfections provide
fertile soil for such influences.
Secondly, our study examines a range of factors that explore ex-ante metrics
determining the market’s perception about the value of the new issue, the issue-
related features driving idiosyncratic market reactions surrounding the announce-
ment period, and those security-specific characteristics associated with individual
forms of issuance which promise to illuminate operational arrangements, including
management and monitoring matters.
Thirdly, we elected to study security issuance with reference to China. This decision
was prompted by the fact that China is an emerging economy of global importance
whose financial markets are permeated with a particularly large, complex and intrigu-
ing body of informational asymmetry problems. Publicly listed firms in China have
long experienced the consequences of dual classes of shareholding, unclearly defined
property rights, and a lack of legal protection of minority shareholders’ rights. Partic-
ipants in the market include rent-seeking local governments, predatory corporations
and dominant shareholders intent on pulling in money and misallocating funds ex
post by various devices, notably in the form of related-party transactions directed at
transferring wealth from minority shareholders to the dominant shareholders and the
parent company (Aharony et al., 2010; and Liu et al., 2013). Further, disclosure is far
less comprehensive in China than in more mature markets. The resulting challenge
extends to many aspects of financing. For instance, Dedman et al. (2015) in their
study of dividend policy well recognise the contentious problems presented by China’s
market, with its limited transparency.
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Our findings give us four fresh insights. First, we observe a negative reaction
to both open offers and notably rights issues when the issue is announced. Plain
equity financing entails adverse-selection costs associated with the perceived unre-
liability of the underlying assets. Further, contrary to the certification argument,
the unfavourable reaction received in the case of private placements in the pre-
announcement period is consistent with outside minorities’ anticipation of exploita-
tion in the form of price manipulation by the dominant controlling shareholders. In
the post-announcement period, the market is reassured by the strategic deployment
of assets or cash by targeted investors. In the convertible bond case, the market’s
reaction is consistent with its opinion that a convertible can align management and
shareholders’ interests especially when backed by powerful regulation. Second, we
find that ex-ante measures which reflect the market’s pre-announcement predictions
of the value of the new issue – manifested in growth opportunities, price run-up
and dividend distribution policy – feature significantly among the factors which are
specific to the issuer and the type of security issuance. Within this overall set of
findings, ownership concentration causes value losses in the offerings of equity where
agency problems are predominant, but such problems impinge less in the case of
convertible bond issues, due to both inherent disciplines and stringent regulation
of convertible bonds in China. Third, within the market mechanisms related to
the issue, including underwriting, auditing and analysts, there arise agency matters
in the period surrounding the announcement. Weak protection of shareholders
appears in the form of security mispricing and market inefficiency in the provision
of information to shareholders. These factors powerfully explain the different market
reactions. We find particularly instructive evidence of the significance of the intended
use of issue proceeds, most notably when these proceeds are committed to high-
tech projects or projects which otherwise increase the real asset base. Fourth, with
respect to features specific to the type of security, our study reveals that investors
are vulnerable to misbehaviour associated with exploitative renunciations in the
case of rights issues, price manipulation by controlling shareholders in the case of
private placements, and ratings with limited signalling value in the case of convertible
bonds.
We contribute to the literature in two respects. By addressing comparatively the
range of methods of seasoned issues, we identify how far distinct features of individual
types of issuance appear to influence market reaction. A contribution of this different
approach is its basis that seasoned offerings differ in terms of market transparency and
the efficacy of regulations and public credulity, thereby shaping the market perception
of each individual issuance and accounting for the observed differences in market
price movements. Further, by analysing individually important determinants of market
reaction for each issue and by relating these to investors and to the market as a whole,
we produce new evidence of how far both informational asymmetries and free cash
flow agency problems germane to security issuance determine differential market
reactions. We suggest how dysfunctional misbehaviour at both the institutional and
individual levels can be effectively controlled and governed by explicit and implicit
disciplines in the context of a non-perfect market such as China. Our empirical
analyses provide a more realistic view of how the market, issuers and investors
interact in the issuing process, and hence identify new implications for capital market
regulators and participants.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses security
issuance and the institutional background in China. Section 3 sets out and discusses
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the methodology, as well as develops our hypotheses. Section 4 presents and discusses
the empirical results. Section 5 concludes and provides policy implications.
2. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
With the establishment of the two stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1991,
Chinese firms gained an additional financing channel, and equity finance has since
become the main instrument for firms seeking new funds. Chinese firms intending
to undertake a seasoned issue of securities can essentially choose among rights issues,
open offers, private placements and convertible bonds under the existing regulation.
(i) Rights Issues
A distinctive feature of rights issues is that they have the power to maintain ownership
balance. This feature influenced China’s government to introduce rights issues in 1992
as a seminal substantive step. However, China differs from virtually every other market
with respect to the renunciation of rights. In the US, the proceeds of renounced rights
are distributed to shareholders by managers of the issue. In the UK, entitlements
that are renounced are commonly placed with an intermediary or directly with other
investors. The transfer of rights was allowed in China during the period 2000 to 2001,
but soon scrapped due to improper trading in the secondary market, which severely
damaged investors’ confidence.
Rights issues are subject to distinctive regulation whereby issuing firms are required
to meet three basic accounting criteria set out by the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC). First, in terms of profitability, there must normally be a record
of the certified net profit for three consecutive years and average return on equity
(ROE) of no less than 10%. Second, in terms of issue size and frequency of issuance,
the number of new shares is strictly limited to 30% of the firm’s existing share capital
in the year prior to the issuing year, and two consecutive offerings cannot be made in
two consecutive accounting periods. A third criterion makes offerings subject to best-
effort agreement. However, there is no restriction on the discount on the subscription
price and the benchmarking date for pricing.
Rights issues in China also differ from the case of mature markets, where rights
issues are frequently used to reduce gearing, especially when bad times generate
over-borrowing. In China, rights issuers frequently pay scant attention to the optimal
corporate capital structure and accountability to shareholders (Liu et al., 2013).
Ownership of companies is dominated by the state, resulting in a capital market that
is under the tight control of the government with state ownership accounting for
more than 60%. Ownership dilution is accordingly relatively less important than in
conventional mature markets. The state-controlling shareholders frequently propose
rights offers, but opt later to give up the pre-emptive rights or not fully subscribing
their rights. Minority shareholders who are hard put to prevent an issue suffer to the
extent that part of the funds raised tends to be dysfunctionally deployed rather than
being invested in beneficial projects (Shleifer, 1998). Further, rights are usually sold at
a discount in favour of state shareholders with a controlling stake to the detriment
of minority shareholders. These factors combine to cause loss of value for public
shareholders, thereby impairing public trust.
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(ii) Open Offers
Open offers were initiated in 1994 on an experimental basis. Compared to rights
issues, open offers to the general public and institutions are subject to less strict
issue criteria. The CSRC requires a record of the certified net profit for three years
preceding the issuance with an average ROE of at least 6%. In particular, there is no
restriction on the quantity of cash that can be raised in a single issue. As a consequence,
open offers have become greater in value than rights issues. Table A1 shows that
open offers became increasingly popular from 2000 until 2008, when the share-split
structure reform had been completed.
With respect to pricing, the subscription price in open offers must not be dis-
counted by more than the average market price of 20 trading days prior to the
benchmarking day or the average market price of the last day prior to the announce-
ment of the letter of intent. This guards against issuing artificially and manipulatively
priced holdings to powerful applicants, some of whom are able to access loans from
connected sources. In an evolving market that aspires to gain a reputation for order
and stability, substantial intentional discounting would undesirably lead to speculative
and insider stagging opportunities, and published flotation information would be
discredited as a consequence.
The issue requirements have been subject to frequent revision by the CSRC.
Although the CSRC later tightened the issue criteria, including the restriction on issue
size, these criteria remain less restrictive than those applied to rights issues. Hence
open offers are vulnerable and lend themselves to manipulation for the purpose
of raising large amounts of discretionary cash. Funds drawn from the market are
maliciously pooled and channelled into projects that bear little or no relation to the
destination set forth in the prospectus – sometimes into fake or fictitious investments.
Some projects, even though bearing managerial approval, fall victim to uneconomic
issue costs and market underperformance (Liu et al., 2013).
(iii) Convertible Bond Issues
Convertible bonds were formally introduced in 1998. The authorities administer them
and their regulation is markedly strict. The CSRC stipulates that (1) the minimum
issue amount should be 100 million yuan; (2) total debt balance should not exceed
40% of the firm’s net assets; (3) net assets should be no less than 2.5 billion yuan;
and (4) the firm must have maintained a record of positive profitability with an ROE
of no less than 10% for three consecutive years. Initially, convertible bond issues were
confined to state-owned enterprises that meet the criteria with respect to the minimum
issue amount, ROE, profitability, total assets and debt-equity ratio. Preference was
afforded to firms operating in the fields of energy, raw materials and infrastructure
as well as to key national enterprises. In 2001, permission to issue convertible bonds
was extended from state-owned enterprises to all listed firms, together with additional
stringent criteria on capital adequacy and guarantees: the issuer must have guarantors
with joint and several liability or an asset-backed pledge; issuers shall have convertible
bonds rated initially at the time of issue and thereafter annually by a qualified
credit rating agency. This finally became a requirement for all issues in 2006. Due
to these restrictions, convertible bonds are confined to large issues by creditable
companies.
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Despite strict regulation aimed at governing and ensuring quality and credibility
of issuers, abuses of process can and do arise in the form of the same personal,
uneconomic ‘money collecting’, which already exists in open offers and rights
issues.1 Thus, convertible bond issues must be monitored by regulators to prevent
dysfunctional discretionary behaviour on the part of management.
(iv) Private Placements
Private placements were only introduced in 2005 at the time of the launch of the share-
split structure reform. They are confined either to a group of controlling shareholders
or to institutional shareholders with a view to restructuring assets or obtaining
fresh cash for investment to facilitate the process of state-ownership restructuring.
The accounting-based regulations on private placements are less strict than those
associated with any other methods of issuance in terms of financial performance
and audited reports. The CSRC only requires a record of net profit for one year
preceding the issuance, according to ‘Measures for the Administration of Issuance
of Securities by Listed Companies (2006)’, and ‘Interim Measures for Supervision
and Administration of Private Placements (2014)’. This is far below the requirements
laid down for offers to existing shareholders or to the general public. There are no
restrictions on the subscription quotas for investors, and greater flexibility regarding
the choice of benchmarking dates for the subscription price, board meetings, share-
holder applications and the process of issuance. In addition, there are no mandatory
requirements concerning dividend record or post-issue operational performance, as
is the case for other methods of issuance. This lenient regulation has encouraged
issues by firms seeking to inject sound assets through mergers and acquisitions, or
issues by firms with poor performance, or that are under threat of failure and so
in need of strategic cash. Private placements quickly became the most widely used
financing vehicle for raising equity capital. As shown in Table A1, private placements
are implemented far more frequently and in larger volume than any other methods of
issuance.
The accounting regulations, however, require that the subscription price must
not be below 90% of the average market price in the 20 trading days prior to the
benchmark day. Placements for the purpose of company reorganisation must be at no
less than the average market price in the 20 trading days before the record date. Unlike
1 Largely encouraged by the Chinese government’s policy in support of stock market expansion and the
less demanding issue criteria introduced in 2006, an increasing number of firms developed ambitious plans
to raise new funds at the beginning of 2008. Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd., which is
the second largest insurer in China, announced its intention to raise 160 billion yuan through the issuance
of 1.2 billion new shares and 41.2 billion yuan convertible bonds in January 2008. This was claimed to be
one of the world’s largest ever issues of this type of security. Following their example, 43 firms unveiled issue
packages totalling 204.3 billion yuan in a single month. This high frequency unnerved investors who feared
corporate exploitation of the government’s policy by seizing more money. Investors dumped the shares of
these firms amid panic selling, triggering a plunge in the stock market. The Shanghai Composite Index
dropped by 17% within 10 trading days following the announcements. The spate of issue plans was dubbed
‘SEOgate’ – the worst episode of ‘pulling money from the market’ witnessed in China since 1992 (Tan,
2008). This destroyed investors’ confidence almost irreparably. In order to rectify this situation, in 2008,
the CSRC issued a series of regulations to improve information disclosure, strengthen the implementation
of the legal responsibilities of the parties concerned, ensure the continuation of the dividend distribution
system and reform the sponsorship system to safeguard shareholders’ interests.
C© 2016 The Authors Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
MARKET REACTION TO SEASONED OFFERINGS IN CHINA 605
in mature markets where purchasing firms typically comprise arm’s length collective
investors, purchasers in China normally comprise the controlling shareholders or the
parent company of the issuing firm. It is commonly observed that private placement
shares are sold at a premium to institutional investors but at a discount to the
controlling shareholders and the parent company (Wu et al., 2010). The certification
effect associated with private placements in mature markets may accordingly not hold
for China’s market, since the allocation to the controllers and the parent could offset
the benefit of any certification effect (Slovin et al., 2000). Furthermore, the absence
of a strict benchmark date is often accompanied by insider trading and the transfer of
benefits from minority shareholders to controlling shareholders (Yu et al., 2006).
It is clear from the above discussion that the institutional context of China
differs from mature, more efficient markets with respect to the motivation, initiation,
management and monitoring of security offerings and the resulting interactions
among regulators and players in themarket. In particular, in the case of rights offering,
the issuers are predominantly state-owned. The largest shareholders typically initiate
rights offerings, but opt to give up the pre-emptive rights or do not fully subscribe
to their rights. Opportunistically available cash is often harvested without serious
consideration of prospective returns or is channelled into related-party transactions,
and investors in many cases register their concern by making a poor response to the
issue. Open offers frequently exploit timing opportunities and are accompanied by
personal activities that depart from shareholder wealth maximisation. Issuers alter
the usage of proceeds from that specified in the prospectus, and proceeds may
be deployed non-productively (Liu et al., 2013). Private placements are commonly
linked to controlling shareholders’ entrenched positions to the detriment of minority
shareholders. The management attempt to cut the costs of purchasing new shares for
the controlling shareholders by timing and manipulating listing suspension prior to
the placement announcement (Wu et al., 2010). Convertible bonds are subject to strict
accounting regulation and public scrutiny. However, to a lesser extent than other forms
of issuance, they remain vulnerable to becoming routes to personal, uneconomic
‘money collecting’.
In an attempt to rein in abuses of the issue process and other rent-seeking
behaviours associated with fundraising, the government has introduced a series of
accounting-based security regulations and policies since 1994, and the new regulations
have helped to curb money collecting and selection problems (Chen and Wang,
2007). Nevertheless, these regulations do not invariably carry the full force of law.
Their moral authority is under constant challenge, such that violations are common
and the perpetrator may suffer as a result of future incredulity on the part of the
market (Liu et al., 2013). Although the Securities Law and Company Law have enacted
sanctions against wrongdoing, these are not clearly defined in the ordinances. The
weak and inefficient regulatory institutions and market environment further hinder
the enforcement of laws and regulations. Between 1994 and 2006, the CSRC listings
rules were revised ten times in an attempt to prevent abuses of the issue process and
rent-seeking behaviours referred to above. Nevertheless, controlling shareholders and
parent companies continue to embezzle subsidiaries’ funds by raising equity by means
of seasoned issuance, to the detriment of minority shareholders. Under an incomplete
mechanism for shareholder meetings, it remains difficult for minority shareholders to
monitor the extent to which funds are deployed for the benefit of firm value.
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In summary, financing misbehaviour is rooted in the state-controlled ownership
structure, ineffective legal protection for minority shareholders, weak supervisory in-
stitutions, and a predilection among certain private investors for short-term irrational
gambling on shares. Furthermore, regulatory weakness and informational opacity
together increase the risk of the misallocation of funds. Results are manipulated and
under-reported in the personal interests of promoters and intermediaries who are able
to exert effective pressure to bear, even on supervisory bodies, including auditors. A
particular dysfunctional impact of these imperfections is to undermine trust in the
market by deterring long-term, sophisticated institutional and international investors
on whom the market’s future success depends.
3. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
(i) Data and Sample Selection
We analyse 1,810 registered seasoned issues conducted by domestic companies listed
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 1991 and
2010 inclusive. We collect information regarding seasoned issues from the Seasoned
Equity Offerings Database and China’s Bond Market Database. We obtain other
data for cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) analysis and multiple variable analysis
from China’s Stock Market Database and the Accounting Research Database.2 The
intended use of proceeds as stated at the time of the announcement is derived from
the Wind Financial Terminal and checked in the official newspaper, China Securities
Times. We include all firms that have been delisted from the stock exchanges to
avoid survival bias, but exclude any firm with a seasoned offering that does not
have a CSRC report of the filing or of an announcement of intention to issue. To
avoid information contamination by other simultaneous corporate events, we exclude
certain events occurring within 20 days either side of the announcement of the
issue. Such potentially confounding events include the annual report, interim report,
corporate restructuring, merger and takeover bids, earnings reports, dividends, stock
splits, market buybacks and suspension or delisting from the official listing. After
screening for such confounding events, the final sample consists of 1,659 seasoned
issues, comprising 974 rights issues, 239 open offers, 375 private placements and 71
convertible bond issues.
To examine how the market interprets the various types of seasoned issue an-
nouncement, the issuing firms are disaggregated into open offer firms (OO-firms),
private placement firms (PP-firms), rights issue firms (RI-firms), and firms issuing
convertible bonds (CV-firms). This grouping enables us to examine significant dif-
ferences such as those implied by the Myers and Majluf (1984) signalling-based model
concerning issues to new as opposed to existing investors as well as issues to public as
opposed to targeted investors. The grouping further enables us to examine differences
such as those implied by agency debate concerning the distinguishing features of plain
equity issues and issues in the context of convertible bonds.
2 These databases have been developed by the Centre for China Financial Research of the University of
Hong Kong and by Guo Tai An Information Technology Ltd.
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The theoretical discussion in the literature and the distinctiveness of security
issuance in the case of China, as discussed, lead us to the expectation that the
market will react negatively to rights issues and open offers. It is expected that private
placements will likewise result in a negative reaction in the period leading up to
the announcement owing to the agency costs which result from price manipulation
through the power of self-seeking controlling shareholders. A positive reaction may
follow the announcement as the market is reassured by the quality of strategic
investment by targeted investors. In the case of convertible bond issues, we expect
a positive reaction to the extent that the market anticipates the benefits of strict
regulation and contractual discipline.
(ii) Events Study Methods
We adopt a modified risk-adjusted market model to examine the impact of the four
types of issue announcement on short-term market price movement. We use the
value-weighted Composite Index of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange
as the market return for the companies listed on the respective stock exchanges.
We define the issue announcement date for each type of issuance according to the
CSRC regulatory requirements. For rights issues and open offers, the announcement
dates correspond to the first public announcements of the intention to raise equity
capital by way of rights and open offers. Under the CSRC listing requirements, an
issuer is required to announce promptly both its intention to make an issue and
its chosen method of issuance. For private placements, the announcement date
corresponds to the announcement of the board meeting date. For convertible bonds,
the announcement date is deemed to be the date of the publication of the issue. The
daily risk-adjusted abnormal return (AR) is calculated as follows:
ARi,t = Ri,t − (αi + βiRm,t), (1)
where ARi,t is the abnormal return on stock i on day t; Ri,t is the daily actual or realised
stock return adjusted for reinvested cash dividends; Rm.t is the daily value-weighted
market returns with cash dividends reinvested on the index of the stock exchange
where the issuing firm is listed; and t is the number of days that elapse before (–) or
after (+) the issue is announced. The coefficients αi and βi are ordinary least squares
estimates of the intercept and the slope for stock i. We estimate the model coefficients
using 240 daily stock return observations starting from 300 to 61 days prior to the
issue announcement date as defined for each type of issuance. The Ri represents
a theoretical value growth of a stock holding over a specified period, assuming
that all dividends are re-invested to purchase additional stocks at the price on the
ex-dividend day.
Further, we construct the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as the sum of the
abnormal returns over the event window around the announcement date. Abnormal
returns are generated for the five-day event window: two days before the announce-
ment date to two days after it [–2, +2]. This period is considered to be sufficiently
long to compensate for any major delayed responses after the announcement date,
while being sufficiently short to minimise the number of confounding events. We
have conducted tests for various event windows including two, three, five and ten
C© 2016 The Authors Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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days surrounding the announcement period. The results show that the five-day event
window has the highest t-statistic value (see Table 2). Hence, we report results for the
five-day event window. Event period CARs are thus computed as:
CARi,t =
T∑
t=1
ARi,t , (2)
where CARi,t is the cumulative abnormal return of share i from date t to date T.
We construct reference portfolios in addition to a market portfolio as a benchmark
for calculating abnormal returns. We construct the reference portfolios with firm size
and market-to-book (MB) ratio based on the Fama and French (1993) three-factor
model. For a given year, size is the annual reported market value, and MB ratio is the
annual reported market-to-book ratio. To construct the reference portfolios in year t,
we first divide the firms into two groups according to the firm’s market capitalisation
(size ranking). Each group is then divided into three subgroups according to the MB
ratio (value ranking). We then calculate the average annual return of each subgroup.
SMB and HML are calculated as ‘small cap minus big’ and ‘high B/M minus low’ to
measure the historic excess returns of small size caps and ‘value’ stocks over the market
as a whole.
To test the significance of ARi,t and CARi,t , we compute the standardised residual
t-test (SRT) based on Bohren et al. (1997). We employ standardised abnormal returns
to prevent AR and CAR with large variances dominating the test.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
(i) Abnormal Return and Cumulative Abnormal Return Analysis
Table 1 reports daily abnormal returns (ARs) surrounding the announcement for
the four types of seasoned offerings. Distinctive price adjustment patterns emerge.
For rights issues, the daily abnormal returns are negative in the interquartile range
(the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile) of −0.14% to −0.06% prior to the
announcement. The decision to announce a rights offering after a period of significant
and negative market returns signals the market’s anticipation of the activities of the
dominant controlling shareholders whose primary intention is to collect cash from the
market with little intention of taking up their rights. This market expectation triggers
significant negative price reactions accordingly.
Upon the announcement, the price drops by 0.50% to −0.63%. The dominant
or otherwise influential shareholders habitually surrender their subscription rights
after the issue announcement with a renunciation rate reaching 90.76% as shown
in Table 4. The price drop confirms the prior-market anticipation of cash-siphoning
behaviour on the part of self-serving controlling shareholders. The daily abnormal
returns then remain at the new low level in the interquartile range of −0.20% to
−0.07%, and it appears to take time for the market to revert to its original level.
This lengthy recovery indicates a lack of confidence in the market caused by a well-
founded anticipation of the commonly observed phenomenon of fund allocation by
state controllers in the form of related-party transactions and intra-group transfers.
The negative reaction to rights issues in China does not support the conventional
C© 2016 The Authors Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
MARKET REACTION TO SEASONED OFFERINGS IN CHINA 609
T
ab
le
1
D
ai
ly
A
bn
or
m
al
R
et
ur
n
s
(A
R
s)
ar
ou
n
d
th
e
Is
su
e
A
n
n
ou
n
ce
m
en
tD
at
e
by
Is
su
e
M
et
h
od
R
ig
ht
s
Is
su
es
O
pe
n
O
ffe
rs
Pr
iv
at
e
Pl
ac
em
en
ts
C
on
ve
rt
ib
le
B
on
d
Is
su
es
D
ay
(s
)
M
ea
n
SE
M
ea
n
SE
M
ea
n
SE
M
ea
n
SE
−3
0
0.
00
01
(0
.0
02
4)
−0
.0
00
8*
*
(0
.0
00
4)
−0
.0
02
0
(0
.0
06
8)
−0
.0
01
0
(0
.0
00
7)
−2
9
0.
00
02
(0
.0
02
1)
−0
.0
00
9
(0
.0
05
8)
−0
.0
02
3
(0
.0
03
2)
0.
00
13
*
(0
.0
00
7)
−2
8
−0
.0
00
6
(0
.0
02
2)
0.
00
53
(0
.0
05
7)
0.
00
41
*
(0
.0
02
4)
0.
00
14
(0
.0
02
7)
−2
7
−0
.0
00
9*
(0
.0
00
5)
0.
00
57
(0
.0
06
1)
−0
.0
01
3
(0
.0
03
2)
0.
00
21
**
(0
.0
00
9)
−2
6
−0
.0
01
2
(0
.0
02
2)
−0
.0
00
2
(0
.0
05
5)
−0
.0
01
1
(0
.0
02
7)
−0
.0
00
1
(0
.0
01
7)
−2
5
0.
00
08
(0
.0
02
2)
−0
.0
04
0
(0
.0
06
1)
0.
00
04
(0
.0
03
1)
0.
00
18
(0
.0
02
5)
−2
4
−0
.0
01
3
(0
.0
01
8)
−0
.0
02
1
(0
.0
05
4)
0.
00
15
(0
.0
03
3)
−0
.0
00
2
(0
.0
02
3)
−2
3
−0
.0
00
1
(0
.0
01
9)
−0
.0
03
4
(0
.0
06
4)
−0
.0
02
1*
*
(0
.0
01
0)
(0
.0
00
2
(0
.0
02
3)
−2
2
0.
00
07
(0
.0
02
0)
−0
.0
01
3
(0
.0
06
2)
−0
.0
01
3
(0
.0
03
3)
0.
00
09
(0
.0
02
5)
−2
1
−0
.0
01
5*
(0
.0
00
8)
0.
00
44
*
(0
.0
02
3)
0.
00
11
(0
.0
02
9)
0.
00
13
(0
.0
02
1)
−2
0
−0
.0
01
1
(0
.0
02
3)
−0
.0
04
0
(0
.0
06
8)
−0
.0
00
9
(0
.0
03
2)
0.
00
21
*
(0
.0
01
2)
−1
9
−0
.0
01
4
(0
.0
02
2)
−0
.0
02
1
(0
.0
06
8)
−0
.0
01
6
(0
.0
02
9)
0.
00
15
(0
.0
02
2)
−1
8
−0
.0
03
4*
(0
.0
01
8)
−0
.0
03
8
(0
.0
09
0)
−0
.0
01
8*
*
(0
.0
00
8)
0.
00
38
(0
.0
02
5)
−1
7
−0
.0
01
6
(0
.0
02
2)
0.
00
43
(0
.0
07
0)
−0
.0
01
2
(0
.0
03
3)
0.
00
37
*
(0
.0
02
1)
−1
6
−0
.0
01
2
(0
.0
02
4)
−0
.0
02
6
(0
.0
07
5)
−0
.0
02
6*
(0
.0
01
5)
0.
00
09
(0
.0
02
4)
−1
5
−0
.0
00
8
(0
.0
02
2)
−0
.0
03
7
(0
.0
05
6)
−0
.0
00
5
(0
.0
03
3)
−0
.0
00
6
(0
.0
02
5)
−1
4
−0
.0
01
3
(0
.0
01
9)
−0
.0
02
4
(0
.0
04
3)
0.
00
01
(0
.0
03
0)
0.
00
12
(0
.0
02
5)
−1
3
−0
.0
00
9
(0
.0
02
4)
−0
.0
00
2
(0
.0
03
6)
−0
.0
02
7
(0
.0
03
2)
−0
.0
00
8
(0
.0
02
7)
−1
2
0.
00
02
(0
.0
02
4)
0.
00
28
(0
.0
02
5)
−0
.0
01
3
(0
.0
03
3)
0.
00
18
(0
.0
01
8)
−1
1
−0
.0
00
7
(0
.0
02
2)
0.
00
30
(0
.0
05
9)
−0
.0
01
6
(0
.0
03
0)
0.
00
24
*
(0
.0
01
3)
−1
0
−0
.0
01
1*
(0
.0
00
6)
0.
00
52
(0
.0
06
0)
−0
.0
02
5
(0
.0
03
3)
0.
00
35
(0
.0
02
6)
−9
−0
.0
00
9
(0
.0
02
2)
0.
00
29
*
(0
.0
01
7)
−0
.0
02
2
(0
.0
03
3)
−0
.0
00
9
(0
.0
02
5)
−8
0.
00
03
(0
.0
01
9)
−0
.0
01
7
(0
.0
06
4)
−0
.0
08
4*
*
(0
.0
03
4)
0.
00
37
**
(0
.0
01
6)
−7
−0
.0
01
3
(0
.0
01
8)
0.
00
28
(0
.0
06
4)
−0
.0
01
2
(0
.0
03
3)
−0
.0
02
8
(0
.0
02
1)
−6
−0
.0
02
1
(0
.0
02
4)
0.
00
41
*
(0
.0
02
4)
0.
00
07
(0
.0
03
4)
0.
00
19
(0
.0
02
3)
−5
−0
.0
03
7*
(0
.0
02
0)
0.
00
32
(0
.0
06
6)
−0
.0
01
3
(0
.0
03
0)
0.
00
22
**
(0
.0
01
1)
−4
−0
.0
01
4
(0
.0
02
0)
0.
00
81
(0
.0
07
8)
−0
.0
04
9*
*
(0
.0
02
5)
0.
00
19
(0
.0
02
1)
−3
−0
.0
02
1*
(0
.0
01
2)
0.
01
03
*
(0
.0
06
1)
−0
.0
03
3*
(0
.0
01
9)
0.
00
18
*
(0
.0
01
0)
−2
−0
.0
01
9*
*
(0
.0
00
8)
0.
00
51
*
(0
.0
03
0)
−0
.0
02
8*
(0
.0
01
7)
0.
00
18
**
(0
.0
00
8)
−1
−0
.0
01
3*
**
(0
.0
00
5)
0.
00
42
**
(0
.0
01
8)
−0
.0
02
6*
*
(0
.0
01
2)
0.
00
21
**
(0
.0
00
9)
(C
on
tin
ue
d)
C© 2016 The Authors Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
610 LIU ET AL.
T
ab
le
1
C
on
ti
n
ue
d
R
ig
ht
s
Is
su
es
O
pe
n
O
ffe
rs
Pr
iv
at
e
Pl
ac
em
en
ts
C
on
ve
rt
ib
le
B
on
d
Is
su
es
D
ay
(s
)
M
ea
n
SE
M
ea
n
SE
M
ea
n
SE
M
ea
n
SE
A
D
−0
.0
06
3*
**
(0
.0
01
6)
−0
.0
05
6*
**
(0
.0
02
1)
−0
.0
03
7*
**
(0
.0
01
4)
0.
00
39
**
*
(0
.0
00
2)
1
−0
.0
04
8*
*
(0
.0
01
9)
−0
.0
04
8*
**
(0
.0
01
8)
0.
00
51
**
*
(0
.0
00
2)
0.
00
28
**
*
(0
.0
00
3)
2
−0
.0
02
1*
*
(0
.0
01
0)
−0
.0
02
5*
(0
.0
01
4)
0.
00
48
**
(0
.0
02
4)
0.
00
21
**
(0
.0
00
9)
3
−0
.0
01
9*
*
(0
.0
00
9)
−0
.0
03
5*
*
(0
.0
01
7)
0.
00
35
**
(0
.0
01
7)
0.
00
27
**
(0
.0
01
3)
4
−0
.0
02
1*
(0
.0
01
1)
−0
.0
01
9*
*
(0
.0
00
9)
0.
00
23
*
(0
.0
01
4)
0.
00
15
*
(0
.0
00
8)
5
−0
.0
01
6*
(0
.0
00
9)
−0
.0
01
3*
(0
.0
00
7)
0.
00
12
**
(0
.0
00
6)
0.
00
14
*
(0
.0
00
8)
6
0.
00
14
*
(0
.0
00
8)
−0
.0
01
2*
(0
.0
00
7)
0.
00
23
*
(0
.0
01
4)
0.
00
19
**
(0
.0
00
9)
7
−0
.0
00
9*
*
(0
.0
00
4)
−0
.0
03
7*
*
(0
.0
01
8)
0.
00
12
(0
.0
03
2)
0.
00
45
*
(0
.0
02
5)
8
−0
.0
01
1
(0
.0
04
2)
−0
.0
03
4
(0
.0
03
9)
0.
00
11
(0
.0
03
2)
0.
00
05
(0
.0
02
4)
9
−0
.0
02
9*
(0
.0
01
7)
−0
.0
01
6
(0
.0
02
5)
0.
00
19
*
(0
.0
01
0)
−0
.0
00
9*
(0
.0
00
5)
10
0.
00
13
(0
.0
03
0)
−0
.0
01
2*
(0
.0
00
7)
−0
.0
00
3
(0
.0
02
9)
0.
00
13
(0
.0
01
9)
11
−0
.0
01
9*
(0
.0
01
0)
0.
00
08
(0
.0
06
1)
−0
.0
00
6
(0
.0
02
3)
0.
00
14
(0
.0
01
8)
12
−0
.0
00
8
(0
.0
03
1)
0.
00
05
(0
.0
03
8)
0.
00
21
*
(0
.0
01
2)
0.
00
46
**
(0
.0
02
3)
13
−0
.0
00
5
(0
.0
03
2)
0.
00
11
(0
.0
02
7)
0.
00
14
(0
.0
03
2)
0.
00
11
(0
.0
02
5)
14
0.
00
06
(0
.0
01
8)
−0
.0
02
9*
(0
.0
01
6)
0.
00
14
(0
.0
03
5)
0.
00
12
(0
.0
01
8)
15
−0
.0
01
1
(0
.0
02
8)
−0
.0
01
2
(0
.0
03
8)
0.
00
33
**
(0
.0
01
6)
0.
00
16
*
(0
.0
00
9)
16
−0
.0
01
7*
*
(0
.0
00
7)
−0
.0
02
7
(0
.0
06
5)
0.
00
16
(0
.0
03
1)
−0
.0
00
4
(0
.0
02
5)
17
0.
00
03
(0
.0
03
5)
−0
.0
00
3
(0
.0
06
3)
−0
.0
01
0
(0
.0
03
0)
0.
00
01
(0
.0
02
1)
18
−0
.0
01
9
(0
.0
02
7)
−0
.0
02
7*
(0
.0
01
6)
0.
00
16
(0
.0
03
3)
0.
00
07
(0
.0
02
4)
19
−0
.0
02
4
(0
.0
01
5)
0.
00
04
(0
.0
06
7)
0.
00
10
(0
.0
03
5)
0.
00
36
**
(0
.0
01
8)
20
−0
.0
02
2*
(0
.0
01
3)
0.
00
06
(0
.0
05
6)
0.
00
27
**
(0
.0
01
3)
0.
00
24
(0
.0
02
3)
21
0.
00
08
(0
.0
14
5)
−0
.0
01
4
(0
.0
07
4)
0.
00
18
(0
.0
03
3)
0.
00
41
*
(0
.0
02
2)
22
−0
.0
01
9
(0
.0
15
0)
−0
.0
01
0
(0
.0
06
6)
0.
00
04
(0
.0
03
3)
0.
00
29
(0
.0
02
5)
23
−0
.0
02
1*
(0
.0
01
2)
−0
.0
00
6
(0
.0
05
2)
0.
00
07
(0
.0
03
4)
0.
00
32
*
(0
.0
01
8)
24
0.
00
04
(0
.0
14
7)
−0
.0
00
8
(0
.0
07
6)
−0
.0
00
2
(0
.0
03
5)
0.
00
13
(0
.0
02
2)
25
−0
.0
01
6
(0
.0
14
9)
−0
.0
02
3
(0
.0
07
7)
−0
.0
00
3
(0
.0
02
9)
0.
00
04
(0
.0
02
4)
26
−0
.0
01
9*
*
(0
.0
00
9)
0.
00
05
(0
.0
07
5)
0.
00
14
*
(0
.0
00
8)
0.
00
06
(0
.0
02
6)
27
−0
.0
01
4
(0
.0
10
6)
0.
00
07
(0
.0
04
6)
0.
00
16
(0
.0
03
3)
0.
00
29
**
(0
.0
01
4)
28
−0
.0
00
4
(0
.0
11
1)
−0
.0
01
1
(0
.0
07
4)
0.
00
17
(0
.0
03
3)
−0
.0
00
8
(0
.0
02
4)
29
−0
.0
01
2
(0
.0
13
2)
−0
.0
02
4*
*
(0
.0
01
2)
0.
00
31
**
(0
.0
01
5)
0.
00
14
(0
.0
02
5)
30
−0
.0
01
1
(0
.0
16
0)
−0
.0
02
0
(0
.0
04
6)
−0
.0
00
1
(0
.0
03
1)
0.
00
12
*
(0
.0
00
7)
(C
on
tin
ue
d)
C© 2016 The Authors Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
MARKET REACTION TO SEASONED OFFERINGS IN CHINA 611
T
ab
le
1
C
on
ti
n
ue
d
R
ig
ht
s
Is
su
es
O
pe
n
O
ffe
rs
Pr
iv
at
e
Pl
ac
em
en
ts
C
on
ve
rt
ib
le
B
on
d
Is
su
es
D
ay
(s
)
M
ea
n
SE
M
ea
n
SE
M
ea
n
SE
M
ea
n
SE
B
ef
or
e
A
D
M
ea
n
−0
.0
01
1
0.
00
13
−0
.0
01
5
0.
00
13
M
in
im
um
−0
.0
03
7
−0
.0
04
0
−0
.0
08
4
−0
.0
02
8
25
th
ce
n
ti
le
−0
.0
01
4
−0
.0
02
1
−0
.0
02
5
0.
00
04
M
ed
ia
n
−0
.0
01
2
0.
00
13
−0
.0
01
5
0.
00
17
75
th
ce
n
ti
le
−0
.0
00
6
0.
00
43
−0
.0
01
0
0.
00
21
M
ax
im
um
0.
00
08
0.
01
03
0.
00
41
0.
00
38
A
ft
er
A
D
M
ea
n
−0
.0
01
4
−0
.0
01
5
0.
00
14
0.
00
18
M
in
im
um
−0
.0
06
3
−0
.0
05
6
−0
.0
03
7
−0
.0
00
9
25
th
ce
n
ti
le
−0
.0
02
0
−0
.0
02
6
0.
00
06
0.
00
09
M
ed
ia
n
−0
.0
01
6
−0
.0
01
3
0.
00
14
0.
00
14
75
th
ce
n
ti
le
−0
.0
00
7
−0
.0
00
5
0.
00
22
0.
00
29
M
ax
im
um
0.
00
14
0.
00
11
0.
00
51
0.
00
46
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
93
1
17
5
34
0
81
N
ot
es
:
T
h
e
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
m
ea
n
da
ily
ab
n
or
m
al
re
tu
rn
s
an
d
th
e
st
an
da
rd
is
ed
re
si
du
al
t-t
es
ts
(S
R
T
)
fo
r
eq
ua
ti
on
(1
)
ba
se
d
on
th
e
m
ar
ke
tm
od
el
fo
r
th
e
is
su
e
an
n
ou
n
ce
m
en
ts
by
w
ay
of
ri
gh
ts
is
su
es
,o
pe
n
of
fe
rs
,p
ri
va
te
pl
ac
em
en
ts
an
d
co
n
ve
rt
ib
le
bo
n
d
is
su
es
.
SE
de
n
ot
es
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
r.
A
D
de
n
ot
es
an
n
ou
n
ce
m
en
td
at
e.
* ,
**
an
d
**
*
de
n
ot
e
st
at
is
ti
ca
ls
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
ba
se
d
on
tw
o-
si
de
d
te
st
s
at
th
e
10
%
,5
%
an
d
1%
le
ve
ls
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
C© 2016 The Authors Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
612 LIU ET AL.
wisdom concerning managerial opportunism with respect to mispricing achieved by
timing the issue (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Rather, our results provide evidence of an
aversion to a form of issuance beset by behaviour which militates against the interests
of public subscribers.
The market price effects for open offers during the pre-announcement period
contrast with those for rights issues but similar patterns occur during the post-
announcement period. Open offers evince significant upward movements in price
in the interquartile range of −0.21% to 0.43% prior to the announcement. The
price adjustments in advance of the announcement are consistent with the timing
hypothesis, whereby rational managers create new issues when the shares appear
to be over-priced. In reality, according to our data, managers have considerable
flexibility when timing the issue, since 0.91% of the offerings occur after a positive
price run-up over trading days –30 to –2 (not shown). In response, the market
lowers its valuation of the shares by 0.98% upon the announcement, and much of
the positive announcement effect then erodes by way of a subsequent rundown in
price. The daily abnormal returns settle at the new low level in the interquartile
range of −0.26% to −0.05%. Such post-announcement reactions reflect managerial
opportunism and agency influences. Free cash flow increases following equity issues.
Opportunities for misdirection and the withdrawal of funds abound. Issuers often
divert the proceeds sub-optimally away from the use designated in the prospectuses
without the prior consent of shareholders (Shleifer, 1998; and Liu et al., 2013). A fund
of new, uncommitted resources is bound to be viewed with suspicion, and the issue is
accordingly received unfavourably.
In contrast to open offers, private placements show a downward movement in
price prior to the announcement in the interquartile range of −0.25% to −0.10%.
Targeted investors are typically the controlling shareholders, and private placements
are accordingly often accompanied by price manipulation and insider trading with a
view to transferring benefits from the public to targeted investors. The management
seek to acquire shares at a low price by timing the issue when the price is depressed
in favour of the controlling shareholders as noted by Wu et al. (2010). Such favoured
investors can then later reap huge financial gains from dealings when the price rises.
This opportunism normally occurs immediately prior to or on the trading day itself
(Wu et al., 2010). In anticipations, the market reacts with a significant, negative
response upon the announcement in the form of a 0.11% drop in market returns.
The market’s post-announcement reaction contrasts with the pre-issue case. Most
notably, the majority of any daily abnormal returns revert to the level quickly and
remain positive following the announcement. Firms that conduct private placements
in China are usually underperforming firms including Special Transfer firms and
Particular Transfer firms3 which struggle to maintain their level of operations. Under-
performing firms seek an injection of good assets by their controlling shareholders
or strategic cash by institutional investors. The favourable reaction following the
announcement partly reflects relief as the market witnesses the replacement of bad
assets with good assets and/or the introduction of strategic institutional investors. The
3 The CSRC introduced the delisting system in 1998 for firms that suffer financial or other abnormalities.
A firm is labelled as a special transfer (ST) if it sustains losses for two consecutive years and its shares are
subject to 5% daily price limit movements. If an ST firm fails to become profitable in the third year, its shares
are put under particular transfer (PT) and suspended from trading on the Main Board. The PT firm will be
delisted if it fails to make a profit within six months of its suspension.
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reaction can partly be seen as a response to the certification effect associated with
institutional investment. These together serve to offset concerns about any propensity
to post-issue overinvestment or related-party transactions.
Convertible bond issues experience a spell of positive daily returns in the interquar-
tile range of 0.04% to 0.21% prior to the announcement. The issue announcement
then precipitates a significant market price rise of some 18%. The share price then
remains at the new high level following the announcement in the interquartile range
of −0.09% to 0.29%. A convertible is an instrument of intrinsically good quality due to
its contractual discipline. Conversion terms have the power to signal optimism about
future increase in corporate value with the result that convertible issues can help to
allay the doubts of a more conservative investor habitat. In addition, convertible issues
in China are subject to strict regulatory criteria, guarantee requirements and scrutiny
with the result that such issues are typically undertaken by financially sound firms. All
of these factors inspire strong market confidence.
Further insights may be gained by examining the CARs over various event windows.
These are reported in Table 2. There is a significant, positive CAR over the [–20, –1]
window for open offers at the 1% level, whilst the CARs for rights issues and private
placements are also significant but negative at the 5% level. The CARs over various
other windows in the post-announcement periods, namely [+1, +5], [+1, +10]
and [+1, +20], are negative for rights issues mostly at the 5% level and for open
offers at the 1% and 5% levels, whereas they are positive for private placements and
convertible issues with different levels of significance. The market responses over
these events windows are consistent with the ARs presented in Table 1, altogether
substantiating a distinctive market perception of risks and prospects pertaining to each
form of issuance in China’s market.
Further, the average five-day announcement period CAR over the [–2, +2] window
is –1.64% for rights issues and −0.36% for open offers at the 5% level. Notably, private
placements evince a positive five-day CAR of 0.08% at the 5% level, even though
market returns present contrasting pre- and post-issuance patterns. This suggests
that private placements are generally regarded as a source of strategic investment,
which carries the power to promote the prosperity of firms through the injection of
good assets and needed cash. The five-day CAR for convertible issues amounts to a
significant 1.27%.
In summary, our observed differing reactions across the forms of issuance are only
partially consistent with the empirical evidence for mature markets. Notably, a US
rights issue does not trigger a negative price reaction (e.g., Martin-Ugedo, 2003)
but we observe a significantly negative reaction in our case of China. A convertible
issue induces a negative effect in the US and UK (e.g., Abhyankar and Dunning,
1999; and Lewis and Verwijmeren, 2011), while the opposite holds true for China. A
private placement announcement conveys a positive signal in mature markets (e.g.,
Krishnamurthy et al., 2005; and Akhigbe et al., 2006), but not in the case of our
findings for Chinese issuers during the pre-announcement period.
At the same time, our results share common ground with the implications of
the information asymmetric hypothesis and the agency cost hypothesis. Managers
attempt to exploit mispricing opportunities and investors tend to infer that the firm
is overpriced when an open offering is announced, as per Myers and Majluf (1984).
The unfavourable market reactions to rights issues and private placements during the
pre-announcement period suggest that equity issuance is agency-driven. This impact
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is mitigated when an issue is supported by protective provisions as in convertible
issues or by the injection of strategic resources as in private placements during the
post-announcement period – both being forces which combat agency. Overall, the
negative market reactions in plain equity issuance reflect the particularly powerful
agency problems, which permeate China’s informationally opaque market subject as it
is to the activities of powerful, personally self-interested and otherwise manipulative
investors. This state of affairs accords with our hypotheses, to the effect that the
suspicion associated with equity can be allayed by the safeguards achievable through
convertible bonds. At the same time, it remains unclear how far the negative average
abnormal returns surrounding the time of the announcement in the case of open
offers and rights issues are related to the information contained in a range of potential
determinants. Likewise, we ask what best explains the contrasting market reaction
in the case of convertible bond issues. We further ask why the market price behaves
distinctively in private placements. The above observations and discussion substantiate
the case for further exploration.
(ii) Multiple Variable Analysis
(a) Hypothesis Development
Our empirical results presented above clearly suggest the existence of distinct market
responses to the issue announcement. In order to pursue the observed differences,
we estimate multiple variable regression models to explore the relative contribution
of three sets of variables to market returns for different forms of seasoned offerings.
The variables are designed to represent: characteristics of issuers to capture pre-issue
inter-firm variability; characteristics of individual issues before and immediately after
the announcement; and features specific to the individual type of security. We use the
five-day CAR: two days before the announcement date to two days after it [–2, +2],
as the dependent variable. Our variables are described below and formally set out in
Table 3.
Pre-issue features. Research evidence suggests that the pre-issue features of issuing
firms are crucial in determining the market’s perception of the value of the new issue
(Loughran and Ritter, 1997; and Barnes and Walker, 2006). We accordingly consider
the pre-issue market-to-book ratio, earnings forecasts, price run-up, dividend payment,
ownership and firm size preceding the issuance in the estimation.
Market-book ratio (MBpre-issue). Firms with growth prospects frequently have a high
market-to-book ratio (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; and Christopoulos and Tsionas,
2004). High MB is commonly associated with dynamism and promise; hence the risk
(Fama and French, 1992). In the case of China, there is complementary evidence that
a high MB is associated with growth as well as the risk of failure (Chen et al., 2007).
An equity issue can fuel latent growth and the market’s appraisal of a financing event
will reflect this insofar as it is perceptible and credible. Whilst following the broad
consensus concerning MB, we recognise that in a market with limited transparency
and a measure of corruption, we must be on the alert when examining our results for
any signs that a high MB may be influenced by potentially unfavourable factors such
as the existence of overvalued growth itself, intangible assets prone to overvaluation,
the low quality of tangible assets and the impact of accounting conventions including
C© 2016 The Authors Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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historic cost (Pagano and Roell, 1998), or market anomalies associated with cognitive
biases and agency costs on the part of investors (Lakonishok et al., 1994). We measure
the pre-issue growth prospects of the firm using MB, which is defined as the sum of
assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity, divided by assets,
as at the balance sheet date immediately prior to the issue announcement.
Analysts’ forecasts (FCASTDiverg). The counsel of share analysts may appear at first sight
to be a means of making abnormal gains. The market believes that reputable analysts
supply more accurate earnings forecasts than other analysts. Hence, they are able to
contribute to market efficiency by reducing asymmetric information among market
participants, which militates against mispricing (Bowen et al., 2008). At the same time,
the agency cost hypothesis attributes a favourable bias to analysts derived from conflict
of interests. Biased reports may arise from analysts’ reliance on lines of communication
with corporate executives and/or from pressure to favour client companies. From fear
of jeopardizing business relationships, analysts may be reluctant to make unfavourable
recommendations to current or potential client companies (Francis and Philbrick,
1993; and Feng and McVay, 2010). Such unwillingness appears to apply to China.
Analysts in brokerage firms are under intense pressure to gain investment banking
business and managers put pressure on brokers to refrain from making unfavourable
recommendations (Ang and Ma, 1999). This causes investors to mistrust earnings
forecasts published in issue prospectuses. The resulting hypothesis is that earnings
forecasts are positively, but weakly, correlated with abnormal returns, regardless of the
form of issuance. To test market sensitivity to analysts’ forecasts, we use the divergence
of analysts’ forecasts, FCASTDiverg, measured as the difference between the actual and
the forecasted earnings for the year when the new issue is undertaken.
Price run-up (RUNUP). The timing hypothesis proposes that the management are
systematically trying to create a wealth transfer from new shareholders to existing
shareholders (Alti, 2006). When the firm becomes over-valued, the management
recapitalise the firm through an equity issue. The manipulation of price in the run-up
to an offering is eminently feasible in an environment where accounting and auditing
standards are flawed (Teoh et al., 1998; Shivakumar, 2000; and Cohen and Zarowin,
2010). In response, the stock market reacts negatively to the issue announcement,
which tends to be followed by periods of negative returns. Hypothesising that the reac-
tion depends on both the implications for cash flows and the degree of surprise, we ex-
amine market timing across the four types of issue using RUNUP, which is measured as
the market-adjusted abnormal returns over the 180-day window (event days –181 to –1)
using the value-weighted market index as a benchmark.
Dividend payment (DIV). The role of dividends as a driver of shareholder value
has been subject to controversy over recent decades. Lintner (1956) and Gordon
(1959) formalise the popular, traditional position that dividends are a favourable
signal which, judiciously managed, can improve firm value. Miller and Modigliani
(1961) challenge this traditional position on the basis of their exposition of the ideal
markets case. Opponents hold that dividends have a negative impact on shareholder
value because firms with high dividend payouts have higher required rates of return
and hence lower share prices, or are economically insignificant (Litzenberger and
Ramaswamy, 1979; and Ang and Peterson, 1985). Denis and Osobov (2008) provide a
cross-country analysis to this effect. Others provide evidence to indicate that dividends
are highly relevant to share price but in different directions at different times (Baker
and Wurgler, 2004; and Pinkowitz et al., 2006).
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While the impact of distribution policy on share price remains inconclusive,
dividends may serve as one of the few available credible signals of financial mobility
where market efficiency is limited. However, this may be due to the fact that in China
low cash dividend payments are very common among listed firms. Those firms that
adopt a constant cash dividend policy only account for 5.5% (Allen et al., 2005).
It is commonly observed that many of them pay stable dividends prior to an issue,
but soon reduce or even suspend dividend payments once the new shares are floated
(Fernald and Rogers, 2002). To curb this malpractice, in 2006 the CSRC promulgated
the ‘Management of Cash Dividends by Listed Companies’ with a view to improving the
quality of the distribution system and safeguarding shareholders’ interests.4 Despite
such efforts on the regulator’s part, a dividend may amount to a cash-wasting attempt
falsely to signal a promise or as a means of shedding uninvestable cash in a time of
decline. Given the inconclusiveness of the debate concerning dividends and special
complications in the case of China, it appears to be appropriate to acquiesce in the
inconclusiveness of the debate rather than hypothesise in one direction or the other.
To capture the potential impact of the distinctive, albeit irregular, prior-issue payment
decision, as opposed to the post-issue dividend payment decision, while taking due
account of the regulatory requirements, we define dividend payments using a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm paid a dividend in the two years prior to the
issue, or 0 otherwise.
Ownership concentration (Herf3). Significant changes in ownership structure associ-
ated with the new issue can materially affect the value of both the existing and the
new investors’ stakes in the firm (Kothare, 1997). The liquidity hypothesis suggests
that large block holdings can increase the liquidity of their stakes if blockholders
subscribe for rights and gain a significant portion of new shares (Armitage, 2010).
The corporate control hypothesis proposes that blockholders possess greater resources
than individual investors and can become better informed. They often command
dominant voting power, feel more committed to the firm and, hence, have a greater
incentive to monitor the issuer (Gul et al., 2010). Such a control structure will militate
against the incentive to invest issue proceeds in projects which serve private interests
at the expense of the corporate interest. Against this, agency theory argues that
ownership concentration aggravates conflicts notably between minority shareholders
and controlling shareholders with voting power. These conflicts and potential abuses
operate against a fair market valuation (Slovin et al., 2000).
Corporate ownership in China is highly concentrated in the hands of a single
investor or a group of investors – usually the state itself and state-owned enterprises or
institutions holding over 60% of the voting shares of firms. This highly concentrated
ownership structure has led to entrenchment, encroachment, and appropriation on
the part of dominant shareholders to the detriment of minority shareholders, and
firm value is severely underestimated. This is all the more serious because the legal
protection of external investors is weak. It is commonly observed that the dominant
controllers have a strong incentive and opportunity to seize large amounts of cash
at their disposal to engage in self-serving expropriation, mostly by means of related-
party transactions (Liu et al., 2013). Decisions on seasoned issues cannot therefore be
dissociated from the pursuit of private benefits by controllers who show scant regard
4 The CSRC imposed the ‘Management of Cash Dividends by Listed Companies’ in 2006, which stipulates
that issuers must continue with dividend payments in the two years following the new issue.
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for minority shareholders. Few public shareholders have participated in discussing
issue plans at the available opportunities to exercise any influence on the issue
decision. The opportunistic and vigilant pursuit of self-interest on the part of the
most powerful and influential shareholders will operate unfavourably. The foregoing
discussion leads to our hypothesis that ownership concentration has a negative price
effect when a new issue is announced with the strength of the effect depending on
the extent of investors’ concerns. To test for the significance and direction of the
influence of ownership concentration on market returns, we employ the Herfindahl
index to measure ownership concentration by way of the largest three shareholders’
shareholdings within the firm, Herf3, as at the balance sheet date immediately prior to
the issue announcement.
Size of firm (SIZE). Stocks of small-capitalisation companies tend to be more volatile
than those of large-capitalisation companies (Jain and Kini, 1999). In China, a growing
tension exists between the continued pressure to expand the stock market and the
lack of new capital. Amid asymmetric information about the small-cap stocks and
excessive speculation in the secondary market, investors scramble to buy small-cap
stocks at a high price even where their performance and prospects are distinctly
lacklustre, with a view to stagging them for short-term gains. Trading in the stocks
of large-cap companies is less vulnerable to market fluctuations and subject to more
efficient pricing because their performance tends to be more stable and is closely
monitored by large, active, sophisticated and credible market participants. However,
an unfavourable influence arises when the government’s typical retention of direct
control over many large firms through majority shareholdings encourages managerial
entrenchment and corporate tunnelling. Such a prospect might well be expected to
trigger a negative market reaction. Small firms, by contrast, tend to be shielded from
government ownership, leaving them free to develop their growth potential (Liu and
Pang, 2009). In such circumstances, their managers’ interests are more likely to be
aligned with those of shareholders. We accordingly hypothesise that market returns
are negatively associated with firm size. We measure firm size by the natural logarithm
of the firm’s market capitalisation prior to the issue, adjusted by the inflation rate in
the corresponding year.
Issue characteristics. By way of potentially significant issue characteristics, we consider
underwriting, auditing, discount in subscription price, offering size, intended use
of issue proceeds, and change in capital structure following the issuance in the
estimation.
Discount in subscription price (DISC). The market efficiency hypothesis suggests
that the subscription price should be directly related to the disparity between the
management’s assessment of the firm’s quality and the market’s valuation of the firm
(Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; and Armitage, 2010). In an issue where the underwriter
expects a lower take-up from existing shareholders, underwriters must incur higher
investigation costs and hence impose a higher issue price discount to protect them
from the failure of the offer. As an alternative to underwriting, the issuer can reduce
the risk of a failed issue equally effectively by setting a sufficiently low offer price
relative to the current uninformed market price (Marsh, 1980; and Slovin et al., 2000).
In the presence of information asymmetries, a deep discount issue serves as a substitute
mechanism for ensuring a full subscription to the offer (Bohren et al., 1997).
Under the CSRC listing rules, the subscription price must be linked to the firm’s
market price. To prevent deep discounting and protect shareholders’ interests, the
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CSRC stipulates that the issue price shall not be either below or above the average
price for 20 trading days prior to a benchmarking date in the cases of open offers,
private placements and convertible issues, while no benchmarking date is set for rights
issues. In line with the CSRC’s benchmarking dates for pricing, the announcement
day for rights issues is deemed to be the first publication of the firm’s intention to
undertake a rights issue. The announcement day for open offers is deemed to be
the first publication of the firm’s intention to undertake an open offer. The press
release date of the decisive board meeting is taken to be the announcement day for
private placements. The date of the announcement of the issue prospectus is taken
as the announcement day for convertible issues. Hence, we define the discount in
subscription price, DISC, as follows:
DISC = (Psub , t−20 − P ∗)/P ∗, (3)
where Psub , t−20 is the average closing price for the 20 trading days prior to the issue
announcement date; and P ∗ is the subscription price for new shares for each individual
issue. A larger, positive DISC indicates a higher discount, while a negative number
indicates premiums. If the market discount is a reflection of the quality of the issuers,
then the market should respond favourably insofar as the issuer is deemed to be a
good-quality issuer, whilst the opposite holds for a poor-quality issuer. Further, if the
market interprets rights issues as a special offer to state owners, then a relatively lower
subscription price in relation to the current market price will be viewed unfavourably
and interpreted as a value loss connected with relation-building and opportunistic
undertakings on the part of state owners and other inside parties. It is, accordingly,
reasonable to formulate our hypotheses for the three cases in accordance with the
above discussion.
In respect of private placements, the discount effect may differ according to the
targeted investors. To explore this possibility, we distinguish price discount in the
case of controlling shareholders from that of institutional investors. We hypothesise
that there is a significant, adverse impact on market returns if target investors are
controlling shareholders in accordance with agency considerations, but a significant,
positive impact if target investors are institutional investors in accordance with a
certification effect. To test the significance and direction of the distinctive impacts, we
include the interaction terms between price discount and the target investor, namely
DISC × BUYERController and DISC × BUYERInstitution, in the estimation.
Underwriting (UNDER). The signalling model points to the relevance of underwrit-
ing to firm attributes. The highest quality firms are expected to prefer an uninsured
offer, medium quality firms an underwritten offer and the lowest quality firms a full
commitment offer (Heinkel and Schwartz, 1986). The adverse selection hypothesis
suggests that undervalued firms will tend to experience higher participation rates and
the selection of uninsured issues, leading to a positive price reaction. Low quality
firms with an anticipated low participation rate opt for a full commitment contract,
thus triggering a negative price reaction (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992). An opposing view
holds that the highest quality firms would choose an insured issue because underwriter
certification provides them with a quality seal (Gopalan et al., 2011).
In China, all new issues, apart from private placements, must be underwritten in
line with the CSRC regulations. In the case of rights issues, the CSRC requires that an
issue be underwritten by the best efforts procedure for the sake of quality assurance
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and in the interests of state ownership. The procedure is mandatory, which may reduce
the quality assurance effect associated with auditing. We accordingly expect a small or
zero effect for underwriting. Underwriting decisions on open offers, convertible issues
and in particular private placements are at management’s discretion. Assuming that
the market is aware of the implications of this situation and the costs of the range of
options, our corresponding hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship between
underwriting and market returns, but that the strength of the effect depends on the
risk associated with the chosen method. In descending order of the risk to which the
underwriter is exposed, the methods are full commitment, best efforts and standby.
We employ three dummy coded variables, UnderFull, UnderBest and UnderStandby, for the
three methods. UnderFull takes the value of 1 where an issue is underwritten in full, or 0
otherwise. UnderBest takes the value of 1 where an issue is underwritten by best efforts, or
0 otherwise. UnderStandby takes the value of 1 where an issue is underwritten by standby,
or 0 otherwise.
Auditing (AUDIT). The quality of auditing plays an external monitoring role on be-
half of shareholders in attesting to the credibility of accounting information produced
by management (Cohen et al., 2002). High-quality auditors help to improve the firm’s
corporate governance and restrain agency problems (Hay and Davis, 2004), whilst
low-quality auditors cannot effectively exercise the monitoring of clients’ financial
reporting processes (Claessens et al., 2002) and may be susceptible to coercion. It is
tempting to conclude that a new issue that is audited by a notably more prestigious firm
sends a favourable signal to the market. However in an emerging, uncertain market
with limited transparency, the contrary possibility must be recognised and tested, not
least because sub-contracting to local firms may threaten even a top firm’s credibility.
In China, all listed firms are required by the CSRC to have their new issues audited by
Certified Public Accountants (CPAs).5 An auditor’s commercial relationship with its
client may cause it to be unduly accommodating and – either locally or worldwide –
there may arise a conflict of interest between the audit and consultancy roles. There
have been several cases in China recently where the credibility of audited figures
has been challenged, for example, NQ Mobile. Regulators are tightening the rules
on short sales in order to contain abuses. There is clearly a greater danger with
regard to rights issues, open offers and private placements that do not share the
contractual disciplines of convertible bond issues. Accounting standards remain low
in practice even though international standards nominally apply, and irregularities
are widespread. Analysts are also misled in extreme ways such as hiring employees and
renting inventories in advance of their inspections. It follows that auditing can lead
to outcomes which enhance firm value when a top firm conducts a full audit without
subcontracting, or to outcomes that detract from corporate value when the auditor is
deemed unreliable, or indeed to neither when the market sets no store by the audit
function. We, accordingly, hypothesise that an issue benefits from the presence of
a top-10 auditor. We define a dummy variable, AUDIT, that takes the value of 1 for
Top-10 auditors, or 0 for auditors who are not within the Top-10 category.6
5 CPAs were originally set up and sponsored by the local governments and institutions in the early 1990s,
and have been gradually transformed into independent auditors through a series of reforms. CPAs claim to
have now adopted international accounting and auditing standards and to function accordingly.
6 The Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA) has ranked the Top 100 Chinese audit
firms since 2002 based on their annual revenues as published by CICPA. As the Top-10 ranking is relatively
stable, we extend the ranking to 1998 in order to maintain our sample size.
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Size of offering (OFFER). The price pressure hypothesis suggests that the market
reacts negatively to an increase in the supply of shares because an increased supply of
shares tends to force the share price to drop (Asquith andMullins Jr., 1986). According
to agency theory, issue proceeds are vulnerable to sub-optimal investment deployment
as management exercise discretion regarding their personal interests even to the
extent of threatening corporate survival. Furthermore, raised funds may be withdrawn
into associated companies in which managers have more substantial interests, to the
detriment of the deprived firm (Bates et al., 2009; and Mann and Sicherman, 1991).
At the same time, larger issues stand to benefit from more vigilant monitoring, and
inspire greater market confidence accordingly (Lamberto and Rath, 2010). In this
regard, existing research shows a positive association between large issues and large
issuers and between large projects and high prospective investment opportunities in
both the private and public domains (Jain and Kini, 1999; and Tan et al., 2002).
This argument, however, may not hold for China where a larger issue is most likely
to be beset with substantial agency costs. Management appropriate cash from the
market and direct it into low-yielding investments and tunnelling operations; they even
alter the usage of proceeds from that specified in the prospectus, deploying proceeds
non-productively, altogether impairing long-term firm value (Liu et al., 2013). We,
accordingly, hypothesise that open offers, rights issues and private placements are
particularly prone to agency problems due to the ex-post utilisation of issue proceeds,
leading to a negative market reaction.
Convertible bonds are subject to strict discipline, which mitigates agency dangers
(Stein, 1992; and Jiraporn and Gleason, 2007). Further, in China, firms proposing to
issue convertible bonds are required by the CSRC to have these rated and reviewed
annually in order to account for any outlook changes. The market anticipates effort
and disciplined behaviour. In addition, funds raised through convertible issues are
often linked with national strategic projects. This is likely to extend the scrutiny of
the firm. We therefore hypothesise that a convertible issue is positively associated with
market returns. We define the size of the offering according to the type of issuance,
OfferRI, OfferOO, OfferPP and OfferCV, which are measured, respectively, as the ratio of gross
proceeds raised through rights issues, open offers, private placements and convertible
issues over the firm’s market capitalisation at the accounting year end preceding the
issue.
Intended use of issue proceeds (FUSE). The asymmetric information hypothesis ad-
dresses new financing events but does not distinguish between the different purposes
for which funds will be deployed (Mikkelson and Partch, 1986). Walker and Yost
(2008) document that the market reaction depends on the intended use of issue
proceeds. The CSRC requires that issuers publish a detailed statement specifying
how acquired proceeds are to be deployed across four broad categories. The Wind
Financial Terminal provides detailed information for individual projects and their
corresponding investment amount. We examine all reports for the 1,810 issues
published in the China Securities Times for the period 1992–2010 and ascertain that all
issuers specify the intended use. Most issuers stipulate multiple usage. In such cases, we
adopt the primary stated application as measured by the largest investment amount.
We then allocate each case across four categories, namely, innovation and high-tech
projects, general fixed investment including the acquisition of other companies, intra-
firm investment, and the repayment of debt or financing working capital.
C© 2016 The Authors Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
624 LIU ET AL.
Our hypotheses follow accordingly. As high-tech projects enhance the firm’s com-
petiveness and prospects, and the general fixed investment increases the real asset base
of the firm, we hypothesise that both impinge positively onmarket returns. By contrast,
intra-firm investment carries high potential agency costs primarily associated with
related-party transactions, and hence embodies a negative potential. The repayment of
debt or financing working capital needs does not necessarily change the asset structure
of the firm, yet such repayment may be harmful to the extent that a lower financial
leverage reduces the value of any effective corporate tax shield and that financing
additional working capital needs are equated by the market with a less disciplined
use of resources by management seeking to shirk their accountabilities. Hence, we
hypothesise that there is a negative relationship between the repayment of debt and
financing working capital needs and market returns. We employ four dummy coded
variables, FUSETech, FUSEFixed, FUSEIntra and FUSEDWC, for the four intended usage of issue
proceeds. FUSETech takes the value of 1 for innovation and high-tech projects, or 0
otherwise. FUSEFixed takes the value of 1 for general fixed investment, or 0 otherwise.
FUSEIntra takes the value of 1 for intra-firm investment, or 0 otherwise. FUSEDWC takes the
value of 1 for the repayment of debt or financing working capital needs, or 0 otherwise.
Change in capital structure (DE): The extent of the vulnerability of equity to agency
costs depends on the overall capital structure, in the sense that a leveraged capital
structure incorporates disciplines which offset equity’s agency costs. Judicious financial
leverage helps to ensure that operations are conducted in such a way that they
will meet contractual obligations (Myers and Majluf, 1984). An increase in equity
is potentially detrimental to existing shareholders to the extent that it reduces the
risk of the firm’s outstanding debt without necessarily adding to the value of equity
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This applies even more to the case of China, where the
decision to issue equity brings into play the prevalent, widespread agency issues which
beset the market. The market duly responds unfavourably in the form of negative
market returns. We accordingly hypothesise that a negative relationship exists between
the DE ratio and abnormal market returns surrounding the announcement of the
issuance. We measure the change in capital structure by introducing the offering size
into equation (4) in order to relate the change in capital structure caused by the
amount issued to the overall financial resources invested in the firm:
DE = Debt − αEquit y
MV + (1 − α)Equit y −
Debt
MV
, (4)
where Debt is the total book value of short-term and long-term debt; Equity is the gross
proceeds raised in the new issue; MV is the market value of the firm on day t = –30;
and α is the proportion of funds proposed by the issuing firm for refinancing existing
debt. The market value of the issuing firm is the product of the share’s closing price on
day t = –30 and the total number of outstanding shares prior to the issue (Tan et al.,
2002).
Security-specific characteristics. Features specific to the security issue itself potentially
influence the market’s perception about the value of a new issue and can be identified
in the case of rights issues, private placements and convertible issues. We account in
the estimations for take-up in rights issues, targeted buyer in private placements, and
credit rating in convertible issues.
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Rights take-up (TAKEUP): The liquidity hypothesis suggests that large block holdings
narrow the investor base of the firm, causing a liquidity reduction in the firm’s
shares which, in turn, adds to the price pressure on the shares issued. However, if
they ‘guarantee’ a buy-up of a big portion of new shares, large block holdings may
lead to increased firm liquidity (Kothare, 1997) and reduced ownership dilution or
wealth transfer from old to new shareholders through the lessening of asymmetric
information (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992).
In China, the largest shareholders fail to take up their rights on a pro-rata basis,
but this does not threaten their controlling status as they hold an ultimately dominant
position in the firm by way of a stake exceeding 60%. The management exploit the
opportunity to grab money from the market as soon as the firm meets the issue
criteria, regardless of whether they have enough cash to subscribe for the rights.
Conflicts of interest between the largest shareholders and the uninformed minority
shareholders loom large. This would be expected to drive down the share price
when the announcement is made. If the largest shareholders take up the rights,
the market should respond positively insofar as a lower risk of agency costs will be
perceived. This is particularly significant in China’s prevailing scenario of conflicting
interest, minority exploitation and informational opacity. We accordingly hypothesise
that there is a positive relationship between take-up and market returns. We define a
dummy variable, TAKEUP, that takes the value of 1 if the largest shareholders take up
the rights, or 0 if they renounce the rights.
Target buyers in private placements (BUYER): In private placements, the shares are
offered to selected investors, which are often institutions that may pass them on to the
public. Typically targeted at institutional investors, private placements benefit from the
certification effect associated with the standing of the chosen investors (Wruck, 1989;
and Chakraborty and Gantchev, 2013). Although the placing price must contain some
inducement to subscribe, the undervaluation problems associated with the negative
signals of open offerings are avoided (Hertzel and Smith, 1993; and Wang, 2012).
An offsetting unfavourable impact may, however, arise when a pyramid ownership
structure and intra-group cross-holdings produce strong incentives for the controlling
shareholders to indulge in – as often in China – related-party transactions and
overinvestment (Shleifer, 2000). When targeted subscribers include the controlling
shareholders as applies in China, there is an incentive for management to issue shares
when they are known to be undervalued in the market. When outside institutional
investors are being sought, there is a contrary incentive to issue shares when prices are
known to be high (Wu et al., 2010). Our corresponding hypothesis is that the market
reacts negatively if the acquirer of shares is the controlling shareholder but positively
if the acquirer is an institution. We define a dummy variable, BUYERController, that takes
the value of 1 if the shares are sold to the controlling shareholders, or 0 otherwise.
Rating of convertible issues (RATE): The asymmetric information hypothesis predicts
that the price reaction to security offerings depends on the sensitivity of firm value
to the change in the value of the new securities (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Credit
ratings potentially affect share price by adding to public information about the
creditworthiness of issuers. In China, the CSRC requires that convertible bond issuers
have their convertibles rated and arrange follow-up ratings. All qualified issues must
be rated preferably AA+ and above, but no lower than A–. In addition, the criteria are
set high in terms of profitability, capital adequacy and guarantees. It follows that the
usual benefit of rating in a competitive market is reduced owing to the fact that the
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ratings in China tend to be uniformly high as a result of this quality hurdle (Poon and
Chan, 2008). Our corresponding hypothesis is that a weak, positive relationship or no
relationship exists between credit ratings and market returns. To test the signalling
power of rating as discussed by Myers and Majluf (1984), we include credit ratings and
define a dummy variable, RATE, that takes the value of 1 if the convertible is assigned
AA+ and above, or 0 if it is below AA+ but above A–.
(b) Summary of Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 reports the basic characteristics of variables, comparing the idiosyncratic
characteristics of both the issuers and the issues across the four types of seasoned
issuance. Prior to issuance, it appears that OO-firms have a higher median MB
ratio (1.76) compared to RI-firms (1.62) and PP-firms (1.55), while CV-firms evince
the lowest level of growth opportunities (1.41). With respect to analysts’ forecasts,
it appears that analysts are more reserved in the case of rights issues (−0.003%)
and private placements (−0.005%), with greater divergence regarding cash offers
(0.017%), which reflects their perception of the issuer’s prospects and underlying
risk-taking in their future operations.7 The run-up in price is highest for open offers
(0.29), corresponding to the most significant increase in market returns prior to
the announcement as shown in Table 2, but lowest for private placements at -0.03.
Furthermore, the majority of issuers – particularly in the case of private placements
– pay dividends in the two years preceding the proposed issue, which is in line
with the CSRC requirements. Firms that conduct rights issues, open offers and
private placements have a relatively lower ownership concentration (20%, 15%, and
18%, respectively), compared to CV-firms whose ownership is highly concentrated
(34%). Overall, this degree of concentration shows that the largest shareholders have
absolute control within Chinese firms. RI-firms are the smallest in terms of firm size
(17.60), while convertible issuers are the largest (20.99). This supports the claim that
convertible issues are the natural preserve of large firms.8
With regard to issue-specifics surrounding the issue announcement period, rights
issues tend to be made at a far deeper discount (0.66), compared to open offers (0.12).
In China, the largest shareholders commonly renounce their rights. This arouses
serious concerns among investors regarding potential abuses of the proceeds of the
issue, who often react by failing to subscribe. Underwriters set a deep discount in
anticipation of a lower take-up to protect themselves from potential failure. Notably
among these statistics, the discount for private placements is far smaller, at 0.097 –
just below 0.10, the benchmark for discount price in private placements set out by
the CSRC. This is evidence to suggest that PP-firms cultivate the price in order to
7 Using analysts’ forecasts for earnings per share, we find that CV-firms present the most prosperous
earnings forecasts measured by the difference of forecasted and actual earnings per share (12.84%), while
the reverse holds for OO-firms (9.02%). In terms of issue guarantees and contractual safeguards, the issue
criteria are the strictest in convertible bond issues, helping to restrict issues to sound, well-performing firms.
In private placements, the criteria are the least strict, thus making themmore attractive to worse-performing
issuers.
8 According to the Interim Measures for the Administration of Issuance of Convertible Bonds by Listed Companies,
which was promulgated in 1997 and revised in 2001 and 2006, a company needs to meet the following
requirements in order to qualify for a convertible bond issue: (1) the minimum issue amount should not be
less than 100 million yuan; (2) net assets should not be less than 2.5 billion yuan; and (3) the company must
have been continuously profitable and the weighted averaged ROE should not be less than 10% in the last
three accounting years.
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comply with the CSRC benchmark. By contrast, convertible bonds (−0.03) are sold
at a premium. Convertible issues are implemented by the largest firms with a strong
financial standing, good ratings and credible guarantees, and are backed by strict
regulations. The underwriter accordingly expects to experience the least risk owing
to the full subscription by a confident market.
All rights issues are underwritten by best efforts, which is in accordance with the
CSRC listing rules, whereas 49.47% of open offers are underwritten in this way. In the
case of private placements, it is only 0.66%. In addition, 100%, 27.63% and 19.57%
of the issues are underwritten by the standby method in convertible issues, private
placements and open offers, respectively. Full commitments are mostly used in open
offers (22.78%) where the danger of a failed issue looms largest. This compares with
3.29% for a private placement and none for convertible issues. In the case of issues
which are not underwritten, the majority of private placements (68.42%) are privately
arranged between the issuers and the buyers, but only 8.19% for open offers and none
for rights issues.
In terms of auditing quality, more than half of the issuers are not audited by the
‘Top-10’, except with regard to open offers. This practice may reflect the old adage
that ‘bad auditors drive out good’ with resultant damage to public confidence in
the case of rights issues and private placements; whereas, with high quality issuance
such as in convertible bonds, where implicit safeguards exist, the issuer sets out
to minimise issue costs as in mature markets. The predilection for the Top-10 in
the case of open offers (56%) could be explained by the particularly exigent need
for issuers to garner every possible resource of credibility in order to convince the
market.
With respect to the size of the offering, rights issues are the smallest because
their size is contained by the 30% cap imposed by the CSRC. The largest issues are
convertible issues (0.68), followed by private placements (0.59) and open offers (0.47).
These observations are consistent with Table A1 showing that private placements have
overtaken open offers and become the dominant means of equity issuance since 2005
when the full scale of the split-share structure reform was launched. The shift reflects
the demand for capital or asset injection for corporate restructuring, which accords
with the intention of this reform.
As far as the intended use of issue proceeds is concerned, the most frequently
professed destination is general capital investment, directed at increasing the firm’s
real asset base. This applies to all types of issue except for private placements, and is
highest for rights issues (47.58%). Inter-firm allocation is the most frequently stated
application in private placements (32.53%). Since private placements are intended
to effect inter-firm allocation by means of an injection of fresh cash or assets by the
parent, they may inevitably lead to a risk of related-party transactions and agency-
driven intra-firm transfers. The repayment of debt and refinancing working capital
is the highest in open offers (13.79%). Compared to other groups, more private-
placement firms say that they intend to use the proceeds for research and innovation
(26.51%).
OO-firms experience a greater amount of change in their debt-equity ratio
(19.26%) than other issuers. RI-firms have the lowest level of DE ratio (10.58%),
arguably because the smaller issues required by the CSRC restriction limits their
impact on the financial structure of the issuers.
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With respect to issuance-specific features, in the case of rights issues, 91.63% of the
largest shareholders do not take up their subscription rights or do not fully subscribe
to their rights, confirming the wide claim that they, normally the state controllers,
renounce their rights. In the case of private placements, 27.51% of targeted investors
are the controlling shareholders, while 40.56% are institutional investors, a practice
which differs from the situation in more mature markets. In the case of convertible
issues, more than half of the issuers (56.79%) are assigned AA+ and above, but none
is below A– as required by CSRC listing rules. This is evidence to suggest that credit
ratings are uniformly high among convertible issuers who have striven to conform to
the CSRC issuance rules.
In sum, our initial results indicate potentially significant, distinctive behaviour on
the part of issuers across the different forms of seasoned issuance. We indicate in
the presentation of our hypotheses how this relates both to the context of finance
– notably agency theory – and to the evolving salient aspects of modern China’s mixed
economy. These distinctions and their underpinnings promise testable insights into
finance theory and thereby justify the further analysis that we propose to undertake.
(c) Multiple Regression Results and Discussions
Table 5 presents the estimation results for rights issues, open offers, private placements
and convertible bond issues based on ordinary least squares regressions of abnormal
returns over the five-day announcement period [–2, +2] on variables that may play a
role in determining price effects.
It appears that the pre-issue measures provide the market with certain insights
into the quality of the corporate plan to which investors will be committed. The
results for the MB variable evince instructively contrasting results for the different
forms of issues. The regression coefficient on the MB ratio is highly significant and
positive in the case of open offers (0.27, p < 0.01), but negative in the case of rights
issues and private placements (−0.30, −0.23, both p < 0.05). It is weakly associated
with convertible issues at the 10% level. Combined with the results of the CAR
analysis, the positive significance of MB in open offers does not seem to suggest
that either the market or management set store by corporate growth prospects with
higher MB presaging greater growth prospects. Rather our findings suggest that MB
reflects a measure of overvaluation, particularly given the relative opacity of China’s
market. This overvaluation could partly be the result of over-exuberance and a lack of
discrimination on the part of investors, both of which are clearly visible in the form of
indiscriminate high volume of applications whenever a new issue occurs. The adverse
impact in the case of rights issues and private placements, which are prone to agency
problems owing to the predominance of state ownership associated with the issuers,
could well reflect the reality that issuers – often the state – take the opportunity to issue
at a beneficial price to favoured parties, and the market fears that new investments will
not reinforce prospects but will rather encourage controlling shareholders to engage
in related-party transactions and overinvestment. Overall, our results suggest that the
MB ratio is not perceived as a credible signal of prospects of future investment, but
rather as a measure of overvaluation and mispricing or a measure of market anomaly
associated with agency costs on the part of inside parties. However, we should be
cautious about this interpretation as intrinsic equity values are less reliable in China
than in more market-efficient environments.
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Table 5
Regression Results of the Five-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs
[–2, +2]) around the Issue Announcement Date by Issue Method
Variable Rights Issues Open Offers Private Placements Convertible Bond Issues
Pre-issue characteristics
MBPre-issue −0.303** 0.273*** −0.226* 0.114*
(0.150) (0.106) (0.119) (0.067)
FCASTDiverg 0.156* 0.208* 0.268* 0.194**
(0.089) (0.126) (0.145) (0.096)
RUNUP −0.283*** 0.372*** 0.271* 0.224***
(0.109) (0.124) (0.153) (0.078)
DIV 0.127 0.273* 0.255** 0.163
(0.142) (0.152) (0.127) (0.129)
Herf3 −0.275** −0.191** −0.358** 0.257**
(0.138) (0.082) (0.161) (0.111)
SIZEPre-issue −0.161* −0.254 −0.217 0.138
(0.096) (0.157) (0.133) (0.146)
Issue characteristics
DISC −0.416** −0.348* −0.083* −0.251
(0.199) (0.211) (0.049) (0.207)
DISC × BUYERController −0.356***
(0.132)
DISC × BUYERInstitution 0.268**
(0.130)
UNDERStandby 0.242** 0.171* 0.218**
(0.121) (0.099) (0.104)
UNDERBest 0.228 0.205** 0.182*
(0.141) (0.103) (0.102)
UNDERFull −0.327** 0.137*
(0.164) (0.081)
AUDIT 0.142 0.197* 0.183* 0.092
(0.087) (0.119) (0.108) (0.082)
Size of offering −0.395** −0.364** 0.219** 0.174**
(0.163) (0.161) (0.087) (0.085)
FUSETech 0.498*** 0.492*** 0.377*** 0.462***
(0.151) (0.124) (0.139) (0.138)
FUSEFixed 0.482** 0.440** 0.501*** 0.335**
(0.219) (0.176) (0.167) (0.165)
FUSEIntra −0.514** −0.518** −0.529*** −0.354**
(0.216) (0.253) (0.175) (0.169)
FUSEDWC −0.523*** −0.478** −0.468*** −0.413*
(0.129) (0.231) (0.182) (0.236)
DE −0.237** −0.212 −0.337** −0.144*
(0.115) (0.103) (0.165) (0.082)
Security-specific characteristics
TAKEUP 0.312***
(0.085)
BUYERController −0.330**
(0.164)
RATE 0.081*
(0.046)
(Continued)
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Table 5
Continued
Variable Rights Issues Open Offers Private Placements Convertible Bond Issues
Observations 417 135 261 61
R2 0.112 0.188 0.552 0.315
F 2.767 1.840 4.852 1.896
p–value <0.01 0.0307 <0.01 0.0498
Notes:
The table presents regression results where the dependent variable is the CAR over the 5-day window around
the issue announcement date, CAR [−2, +2]. The other variables are defined in Table 3. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses. F denotes the overall F-statistic, which is used to test the overall significance of
the regression model, with the null hypothesis that all of the regression coefficients are equal to zero. We
control for year and industry effects using year and industry dummy variables in all the regressions.
The sample consists of 1,659 eligible seasoned issues by listed firms in China between 1991 and 2010.
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
The coefficient on FCASTdiverg has the expected sign with different degrees of
significance. There is most significance in the case of convertible bonds (0.19, p <
0.05) but marginal significance for the other forms of issues. The relatively weak
correlation suggests that the market has limited confidence in analysts’ earnings
forecasts in the case of plain equity offerings in contrast to convertible offerings. In
China, as convertible bonds are subject to more rigorous CSRC regulation, they lend
themselves to more extensive analysis than the other more opaque methods of equity
issuance. This rigour increases the transparency and overall credibility of a convertible
offering, leading to favourable market price behaviour.
Our findings in respect of price run-up provide informative differences across the
types of issuance. We find a highly significant, positive effect in open offers (0.37, p <
0.01) confirming our hypothesis that the price in the periods leading up to the issue
comprises evidence that issuers go to market when shares are high or overpriced. This
result is consistent with the observations in the CAR analysis as reported in Tables 1
and 2. Our finding supports the position that timing can be most readily achieved as
suggested by Alti (2006), and is, in practice, being effected through equity issuance
in the form of open offers. Price run-up is, likewise, highly significant and positive for
convertible issues (0.22, p < 0.01), but the circumstances of convertible issuance invite
a different interpretation. In this case, price run-up may reflect the market’s confident
expectations about the quality of convertible issues due to their greater transparency
and disciplinary obligations. Rights issues and placements differ from the foregoing as
well as from each other. Price run-up has a negative impact in the case of rights issues
(−0.28, p < 0.01), but a positive impact on private placements (0.27, p < 0.10). For
rights issues, the direct extraction of wealth dominates the influence of price run-up.
More than 90% of the largest shareholders fail to take up their subscription rights or
do not fully subscribe to their subscription rights as shown in Table 4. Investors regard
rights issues as an opportunity on the part of the dominant shareholders to gather cash
from the market when the price rises and to deploy it dysfunctionally and selfishly even
to the extent, for example, of siphoning funds into associated companies where their
proportionate interest exceeds that in the issuing company. Our results lend support
to Shivakumar’s (2000) and Cohen and Zarowin’s (2010) arguments that managers
exploit mispricing opportunities in an environment where accounting and auditing
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standards are flawed. In the case of private placements, agency influences and the
dominance of the controlling shareholders prevail. The management cut the costs of
purchasing new shares by timing the issue when the price level is low rather than high.
Such price manipulation can transfer benefits from the public to the target investors.
If and when in due course the price recovers, the market is reassured that controllers
are discouraged from taking advantage of the low price. Overall, our findings across
the four types of issue are consonant with the patterns of ARs and CARs observed for
both the pre- and post-announcement periods as displayed in Tables 1 and 2.
There is no evidence to suggest that market returns are associated with any pattern
of pre-issue dividend payments in the case of rights issues and convertible bond issues.
Further, they are weakly associated in the case of open offers. Our results fail to support
the majority of previous studies that examine the role of dividends in firm value (Baker
and Wurgler, 2004; and Pinkowitz et al., 2006), but are evidence to the effect that
the market does not believe that pre-issue dividends presage future dividend levels in
these issues. According to our data, more than 50% of these issuing firms cut or stop
dividend payments shortly after the new issue has been completed (not shown).9 By
comparison, dividend payments appear to impinge positively on private placements
(0.26, p < 0.05), suggesting that pre-issue dividends are seen to adumbrate future
distributions following the issuance. This is also consistent with the observation in
Table 4, where PP-firms are the highest and most consistent dividend payers. The
results suggest a position whereby PP-firms in particular need to attract and retain
investors. Their powerful subscribers possess comparative advantages, including the
ability to enforce a desired dividend pattern. Acquiescence on the part of the firm
helps ensure that the powerful investors do not bail out when the firm goes public.
Ownership concentration is of considerable importance in shaping market price
behaviour. It generates a significant negative impact on rights issues (−0.28), open
offers (−0.19) and particularly private placements (−0.36) at the 5% level. Our
results contrast with Xu and Wang’s (1999) claim that ownership concentration
serves to monitor Chinese firms closely. Agency problems permeate fundraising, and
public equity investors are poorly equipped to monitor managerial planning and
discretion. The stronger effect in the case of private placements corroborates our
hypothesis that ownership concentration aggravates the conflicts between minority
shareholders and controlling shareholders who are usually the targeted buyers. The
role of concentration revealed in our study disagrees with Hertzel and Smith’s (1993)
report that ownership concentration makes only a minor impact on market returns.
Turning to the issue characteristics around the announcement period, we find that
the discount in subscription price is the significant explanatory factor for the five-day
CARs in the case of rights issues (−0.42, p < 0.05). As discussed in Section 2(i), rights
issues are often made in the interests of the largest shareholders and are rejected by
minority shareholders. Additionally, more than 60% of shares in RI-firms are non-
tradable due to their being owned by public bodies, including the state. This may
generate mistrust in the market. Underwriters seek the means of reducing the risk
associated with purchasing the shares of a potentially failed issue by setting higher
discounts, and the market duly responds unfavourably in the form of negative market
returns. The coefficient on open offers is marginally significant. This may be partly
9 In order to govern the dividend payment practice of Chinese firms, the CSRC imposed the ‘Management
of Cash Dividends by Listed Companies’ in 2006. However, those firms that made issues prior to 2006 may
have failed to comply with this regulation.
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due to the fact that the discount in open offers is far less severe than in rights issues
(see Table 4). This may be partly a matter of the underwriters’ risk exposure being less
significant as any underwriter’s allocations will be more easily tradable in view of the
opportunity to trade across a wide and highly active habitat of investors. There is no
evidence to suggest that the price discount matters in convertible issues. This result
supports our expectation that investors worry less about the level of the price set for
convertible issues, as their quality is guaranteed by the high rating.
Our findings in the case of private placements are particularly noteworthy. The
price discount has a small, negative effect on the five-day CARs with a borderline
significance (−0.08, p< 0.10). However, when we consider the interaction between the
discount and target buyers, we find a marked, contrasting impact – the force of which
depends on the market perception of the salient characteristics of targeted investors:
notably their risk, reliability and attitude to investment. Specifically, the discount
generates a highly significant and negative effect when it interacts with the controlling
shareholders, DISC×BUYERController (−0.36, p < 0.01) but a positive one when it interacts
with institutional investors, DISC×BUYERInstitution (0.27, p < 0.05). These results appear
to support our expectation that price discount conveys to the market the message that
private placements are an offer to the largest shareholders to the detriment of public
investors by way of price manipulation prior to the issue and subsequent engagement
in related-party transactions. When privately placed shares are issued to institutions
which have the ability to promote strategic investment, their subscription implies that
they are both willing and able successfully to promote, pursue and consummate such
investments – a point noted by Hertzel and Smith (1993). Hence, the certification
effect prevails.
Overall, our results with respect to the discount in subscription significantly suggest
that the risk of adverse price effects, the quality of issues, and the agency costs pertain-
ing to each type of issuance are taken into account when the new issue is planned.
The impact of underwriting appears to differ according to the type of efforts.
The underwriting of rights issues has no impact on market price behaviour. This
supports our expectation concerning the rigidity of the CSRC policy with respect to
underwriting a rights issue using the method of best efforts. This required procedure
takes insufficient account of the potential risk to be borne by the underwriter
during the announcement period. In general, the market reacts favourably to the
announcement of open offers underwritten by way of standby and best efforts (0.24,
0.21, both p < 0.05), but unfavourably in the case of full commitment (−0.33, p <
0.05). Our results for open offers appear to be consonant with the adverse selection
hypothesis (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992) to the effect that full-commitment underwriting
occurs when issues are expected to fail, while the opposite holds for standby and
best efforts. Further, underwritten private placements experience significant, positive
market returns, regardless of the level of efforts. The results suggest that private
placements are of interest to the market despite any price manipulation prior to the
issue, not least given the scale of the issues and the opportunity to improve the asset
portfolio by introducing cash or directly injecting real assets. Themarket is accordingly
willing to acquiesce in the decision to underwrite a private placement. By comparison,
underwriting a convertible issue by standby has a significant, positive influence on
market price behaviour (0.22, p < 0.05). This is consistent with our expectations
based on the instrument’s inherent discipline and issuers’ desire to minimise issue
costs. Taken together, although these results do not appear to consistently support our
hypotheses and those formulated in the standard context by Heinkel and Schwartz
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(1986) and Gopalan et al. (2011), they at least provide an indication that underwriters
in China differentiate among underwriting methods to signal the quality of a new issue
while seeking to contain issue costs.
The sign on AUDIT is positive for the five-day CARs, as expected, on all equity
offerings with prestigious auditors. However, the coefficients are not significant at
the 5% level. These weak relationships do not support the view of Hay and Davies
(2004) and Claessens et al. (2002) with respect to the external monitoring role of
the quality of auditing, but are evidence to the effect that China’s investors have
limited confidence in the professional competence of auditors. In our additional
regressions, we used the ‘Big 5’ as the measure of prestige auditors (not reported). The
significance increases in these regressions but still not to a significance level. Hence,
the suggestion remains that the market still doubts the credibility of reports issued by
the domestic CPAs. The market cannot but be conscious of the ineffective surveillance
of the quality of corporate reporting and auditing processes. The small and non-
significant coefficients on convertible issues provide an indication that the market is
largely indifferent to the auditor’s prestige, which is consistent with our proposition
concerning the impact of the regulatory discipline surrounding convertible issues.
As expected, price effects of the size of an offering differ across the forms of sea-
soned offerings. Size of offering exerts a significant, negative impact on market returns
for rights issues at −0.40% and for open offers at −0.36%, which are qualitatively
consistent with the negative market price reactions upon the issue announcements
shown in Tables 1 and 2. One could argue that the significant decrease in share price
may be the result of price pressure on the new shares prompted by increased supply;
or that the new issue may convey negative signals about issuers’ earning prospects
(Miller and Rock, 1985). However, in line with China’s position, we submit that marked
agency problems associated with the new issues amount to a substantial driving force
behind these price adjustments. We observe that 91% of the issuers give up their
rights as shown in Table 3. In open offers, issuers exploit the opportunity afforded
by the lenient regulations that are not available to rights issues to gather money on
a much larger scale. According to a number of studies, this leniency is exploited as
issuers deploy resources into non-profitable projects or undertake tunnelling without
any accountability on the part of management (Liu et al., 2013). Further inspection
of our data confirms that there is a higher percentage of alteration of stated usage in
rights issues and open offers than in other offerings (not shown).
By contrast, a positive result emerges for private placements and convertible issues.
In the case of private placements, the positive impact (0.22, p< 0.05) appears to reflect
market trust in institutional subscription because the cash raised will support under-
performing firms or cater for the firm’s need for strategic cash, these benefits being
further compounded by any direct injection by controllers of productive assets. Market
trust to this effect offsets anxiety about management’s abusive discretionary behaviour
in the form of overinvestment and related-party transactions with controlling share-
holders and other insiders. The favourable appraisal of the financing event indicates
that for the market the size of offering presages valuable productive investments,
and may further suggest that investors trust their protective measures, privacy and
communication associated with private placements. The positive impact in convertible
issues (0.17, p < 0.05) confirms our expectations, and also the views of Stein (1992)
and Jiraporn and Gleason (2007) concerning the appeal of convertible bonds to the
market based on contractual and regulatory control. This result is also consistent with
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the fact that convertible bonds are associated with the major strategic evolution of the
corporate plan.
Most significantly, the estimates in Table 5 show that the intended use of issue
proceeds is a distinct determinant of market price behaviour. Two contrasting findings
are particularly eloquent in the following. Firstly, the offerings for high-tech and
innovation projects appear to exert highly significant, positive impacts on the five-
day CARs, regardless of the type of security issued (0.50, 0.49, 0.38, 0.46, all p < 0.01).
This result is consonant with our expectations that market price movement is strongly
accounted for by the promise of enhancing the firm’s competiveness and prospects by
the planned implementation of high-tech projects. Further, issues designated to capital
expenditure generate significant and positive impacts on market returns (0.48, 0.44,
0.50, 0.34, all p < 0.05). The favourable market responses reinforce the suggestion
that these projects are believed by the market to enhance firm value by productively
increasing the firm’s real asset base. The increase in capital expenditure reduces
controlling shareholders’ discretionary opportunities to expropriate uncommitted
resources against the interests of minority shareholders.
Secondly and by way of contrast to the case of issuance for high-tech projects
and capital expenditure, issues designated to the purposes of financing inter-firm
projects generate a highly significant and negative price effect, regardless of the form
of issuance, but most notably in the case of private placements (−0.53, p < 0.01).
It appears that the market identifies such intentions with rent-seeking by means of
the new issue, and infers that ex post the danger of related-party transactions is most
likely to occur. Further, the market responds negatively to the news of resources being
committed to refinancing debt and working capital, regardless of the form of issuance.
These price effects respond to actions which do not change the firm’s investment
in productive assets appreciably if at all, but do serve to increase free cash flow or
meet cash flow shortfalls. These results lend support to Walker and Yost (2008) and
appear to be plausible in China’s culturally distinct, opaque market, where exploitable
discretionary funds all too often precipitate moral hazard, leading to the managerial
pursuit of personal interests at the expense of external investors.
In summary, the intended use of issue proceeds generates the most powerful
impact of any variable on market returns and is the main force in shaping market
price movement following the announcement. This disagrees with Denis (1994), who
suggests that investment opportunity announcements play a small role in adjusting
market prices. The overall findings corroborate our suggestion that the market has
insight into the motivation and economic significance of the intended use.
The capital structure measure generates consistent results. The coefficients on the
DE ratio are negative with regard to rights issues (−0.24), open offers (−0.21) and
private placements (−0.34) at the 5% level, with convertible bonds being −0.14 at the
10% level. This suggests that the resulting decrease in DE ratio following the issuance
reduces the discipline exerted on management and facilitates rent-seeking behaviour
on the part of powerful issuers, as predicted in Myers (1984). The stronger market
movement in plain equity offerings is consistent with Chen (2004) to the effect that
the management of Chinese firms prefer equity to debt – a decision that brings into
play the agency issues which beset the market. The market duly responds unfavourably
to equity issues.
Regarding the security-specific characteristics, we find a highly significant, positive
price effect if rights are taken up (0.31, p < 0.01). Take-up reassures a market that
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the abuses associated with rights issues will be less likely to occur or will at least
be on a smaller scale. Such reassurance is valuable in a regime where rights are
usually implemented in favour of informed, state-controlled shareholders who are in a
position to garner rewards by renouncing rights and diverting issue proceeds, leading
to a loss of value for the public. Our result is qualitatively consistent with that of Slovin
et al. (2000) regarding the potential quality dimension associated with this variable,
and provides a clear indication that, in accordance with our hypothesis, rights issues
are exposed to agency risks.
Further, we take a closer look at the role of target buyers in the case of private
placements. When these buyers are controlling shareholders, a highly significant and
negative impact on market returns occurs (−0.33, p < 0.05). The negative price
reaction appears to contradict the majority of previous studies and theory predictions
(e.g., Wruck, 1989; and Chakraborty and Gantchev, 2013), but supports our proposal
that in the case of China, the market believes that the controlling shareholders who
are target buyers have strong incentives to engage in related-party transactions and
overinvestment. Abuses exploit the typical pyramidal ownership structure and intra-
group cross-holdings as noted in Liu et al. (2013). Together with the reported evidence
from the discount in subscription price, the results markedly underpin our confidence
that when the targeted buyer is the controlling shareholder, private placements are a
means of issuance that are beset with agency problems which aggravate the tension
between the controlling and minority shareholders. However in the case where the
target buyer is the institutional investor, the certification effect asserts itself.
No reliably significant excess stock returns are observed for convertible issues
that are rated AA and above, with the five-day CARs being 0.08 at the 10% level.
Our result contrasts with the more common suggestion – notably the findings of
Poon and Chan (2008), which are based on the data available for one of China’s
domestic credit rating agencies (CRAs) for the period 1997–2003 – suggesting that
ratings generate certification effects. On the basis of credit rating reports issued by all
qualified domestic CRAs, our results show that the ratings assigned by the CRAs do not
convey any new information to the market about the credit risk of convertible bonds.
Our findings disagree with the implication of Myers and Majluf (1984) concerning
the relevance of ratings to investors, including their ability to reduce informational
asymmetries. Rather, our findings favour the contrary position to the effect that ratings
are substantially unheeded (Kennedy, 2003; and Lee, 2006). Ratings’ visible lack of
signalling power confirms our doubts concerning the efficacy of credit ratings due to
the uniform credit criteria set out by the CSRC, which may place the independence of
the agencies and quality of their grading under question.
(d) Robustness Check and Sensitivity Analysis
Endogeneity. Thus far, we have not considered any potential self-selection bias that
might arise as a result of firms self-selecting their issue methods. One cannot rule out
the possibility, however, that high-market-return firms are more likely to select open
issues; low-market-return firms tend to select rights issues; firms with lower leverage, or
whose stock has high market liquidity, are more inclined to opt for convertible issues;
and those with a desire to retain corporate control are more prone to choose private
placements. In such a case, our previous results, based on the sample of issuing firms,
may be subject to self-selection bias in estimated CAR coefficients due to the potential
endogeneity of the data. We address this issue by way of the Heckman (1979) two-stage
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regression approach to take into account the self-selection of the issue method. In the
first stage, we carry out a Probit regression in which the likelihood of the choice of issue
method, denoted by Pr(ISSUE), is regressed on a set of variables that might play a role
in the firm’s issue method decision. This uses the entire sample, including both issuing
and non-issuing firms, on the basis of equation (5). We then compute the inverse Mills
ratio (non-selection hazard), denoted by λ, from the first-stage Probit estimates of
equation (5), and incorporate it into the second-stage regressions to account for any
potential endogeneity. The first-stage selection equation is expressed as follows:
Pr(ISSUEi,t) = λ0 + β1VOLATi,t + β2LIQ i,t + β3CAR−150,−20,i,t + β4MBi,t + β5LEV i,t
+β6SIZEi,t + β7MAN i,t + (industry dummies) + (year dummies) + εi,t ,
(5)
where ISSUEi,t is coded as one for each of the issue methods for firm i in year t, or
zero otherwise. Market volatility (VOLAT) is measured as the standard deviation of
daily return over the preceding three months on a rolling basis. Liquidity (LIQ) is the
relative bid–ask spread measured as the dealer’s bid–ask spread divided by the average
of the bid-price and the ask-price. CAR (CAR–150, –20) is measured as the abnormal
return between –150 and –20 trading days on a rolling basis. Market-to-book ratio
(MB) is measured as the sum of assets plus the market value of equity minus the
book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage (LEV) is measured as total liabilities
divided by total assets. Firm size (SIZE) is measured as the natural logarithm of the
firm’s market capitalisation, adjusted by the inflation rate in the corresponding year.
Managerial ownership (MAN) is measured as the percentage of outstanding shares
owned by managers. Year and industry dummies are included to control for year and
industry fixed effects, and εi,t is an error term.10 The rationale of independent variables
is described below.
The decision to implement a new issue may depend on a variety of factors, including
the stockmarket condition of an individual stock, firm-specific features, and ownership
and control considerations. To measure the stock market condition of an individual
stock, we use market volatility (VOLAT), market liquidity (LIQ) and market price
performance (CAR–150, –20). To capture firm-specific features, we use the firm’s potential
growth (MB), leverage (LEV) and firm size (SIZE). To measure the effect of ownership
and control considerations, we use managerial ownership (MAN). We also include
the stock’s market uncertainty and market liquidity, because the decision to issue
may systematically differ between firms, given that each issue method exposes firms
to different levels of market uncertainty and market liquidity. High market volatility
for rights issues may induce management to issue shares by means of an open offer
(Barnes and Walker, 2006). The market liquidity conditions of an individual stock
may be instrumental in influencing the firm’s choice of issue method, presenting
the market with different levels of information friction and costs of trading stocks
(Butler et al., 2005). Managers may exploit security mispricing and timing exercising
10 According to the 2012 CSRC Guidance for Industry Classification of Listed Companies, the sample firms
are classified into 13 broad industries. Each firm is grouped into one of the industries in each year as:
Agriculture, Mining, Manufacturing, Utility, Construction, Transportation, Information Technology, Retail
and Wholesale, Real Estate, Financial Institutions (the firms in this industry are excluded from this study),
Services, News and Media, and Conglomerates. The industry variable in this study is a time-varying variable.
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issues in their belief that the firm is overvalued when a variety of issue methods
are permitted (Cready and Gurun, 2010). We include the measures for firm-specific
characteristics, because a firm’s growth potential and financial structure may influence
market perception of the firm and hence the interests of investors (Liu et al., 2013).
The decision to issue may systematically differ between well- and under-performing
firms as well as high- and low-growth firms (Jain and Kini, 1999). Further, leverage
can transgress corporate debt capacity, leading to distress. A seasoned equity issue
which affects the debt ratio beyond its optimal level would pose a serious threat to
the firm’s continuity, and thus influence the management’s issue method decision,
especially in the case of financially distressed firms (Myers, 1984). Further, larger firms
tend to have a lower degree of uncertainty and information asymmetry, but at the
same time a greater need for financial resources and financial mobility to meet the
demand for future investment because of the scale of their operations (Jain and Kini,
1999). Notably in China, private placements and convertible bonds are preferred,
partly because of the cap imposed by the CSRC on rights issues, and later on cash
offers, in order to restore order in the issuing market, which would otherwise have
been exploited by self-interest-driven issuers (see Table A1). Finally, the firm’s issue
decision may be driven by corporate ownership and control considerations. Equity
issues dilute ownership, which is likely to militate against the managerial control of
the firm, deterring management from making issues (Masulis, 1986).
Section A of Table 6 presents the first-stage estimates. Overall, we find that the
issuer’s desire to increase the stock’s market liquidity has a significant influence on the
issuing decision, regardless of the specific issue method concerned. At the same time,
the issuer’s capital structure does not appear to influence the issue method chosen,
even in the case of convertible bond issues, and hence does not appear to fit as well
as the capital structure hypothesis (Myers, 1984) would suggest. Our further results
show that the other variables generate differential impacts on the likelihood of the
issue method decision. Lower market volatility and lower growth potential make the
firm more likely to opt for a rights issue. Larger market volatility and greater upward
price movement tend to induce the firm to issue shares by means of an open offer.
Moreover, lower abnormal returns and a stronger incentive to keep ownership and
control over the firm lead to a greater propensity to raise equity capital by way of
private placements. Greater growth prospects and larger firm size are more likely to
give management an incentive to raise cash through convertible issues.
Section B of Table 6 reports the second-stage regression results following adjust-
ment for self-selection by incorporating Lambda, λ, in the regression models. We
cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no sample selection bias, i.e. H0: betaλ
= 0, because all p-values are greater than 0.10 in all four cases. Our results thus do not
suggest the presence of sample selection bias. Furthermore, corrections for potential
self-selection bias have not altered the main results shown in Table 5. The coefficients
of the size of the offering continue to be significant and negative in the case of rights
issues and open offers, while the opposite holds true in the case of private placements
and convertible issues. The results of the other controlled variables remain similar
to those reported in Table 5 in terms of statistical significance and sign. Hence, our
overall results do not indicate that potential selection bias due to endogeneity is a
serious concern for our estimates.
Analysis of the Announcement Period Window [0, +2]. We conducted further analysis of
the issue announcement period CARs over the time window of the announcement
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Table 7
Regression Results of the Three-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs
[0, +2]) around the Issue Announcement Date by Issue Method
Rights Open Private Convertible
Variable Issues Offers Placements Bond Issues
Pre-issue characteristics
MBPre-issue −0.293** 0.251** −0.219* 0.104*
(0.136) (0.123) (0.111) (0.063)
FCASTDiverg 0.129 0.177 0.154 0.187*
(0.165) (0.128) (0.122) (0.106)
RUNUP −0.233** 0.219** 0.192 0.179**
(0.112) (0.105) (0.181) (0.083)
DIV 0.115 0.214* 0.179* 0.148
(0.098) (0.113) (0.094) (0.283)
Herf3 −0.327** −0.226** −0.396** 0.275***
(0.161) (0.103) (0.185) (0.108)
SIZEPre-issue −0.108 −0.205* 0.141 −0.114
(0.126) (0.120) (0.192) (0.098)
Issue characteristics
DISC −0.418** −0.369** −0.139)* −0.272
(0.204) (0.175) (0.082 (0.179)
DISC × BUYERController −0.402)***
(0.159
DISC × BUYERInstitution 0.362)**
(0.163
UNDERStandby 0.327** 0.184)** 0.219**
(0.154) (0.082 (0.111)
UNDERBest 0.237 0.256** 0.194)**
(0.165) (0.125) (0.096
UNDERFull −0.409** 0.283)*
(0.207) (0.173
Audit 0.192 0.214 0.216) 0.104
(0.123) (0.158) (0.277 (0.122)
Size of offering −0.419** −0.493*** 0.238)** 0.241**
(0.195) (0.112) (0.114 (0.113)
FUSETech 0.564*** 0.602*** 0.468)*** 0.471**
(0.214) (0.227) (0.145 (0.235)
FUSEFixed 0.587*** 0.613*** 0.571)*** 0.383**
(0.205) (0.202) (0.119 (0.194)
FUSEIntra −0.537*** −0.697*** −0.548)*** −0.365**
(0.124) (0.243) (0.209 (0.173)
FUSEDWC −0.541*** −0.536** −0.461)*** −0.427**
(0.102) (0.234) (0.280 (0.211)
DE −0.248** −0.239** −0.358)** −0.186*
(0.126) (0.115) (0.173 (0.097)
Security-specific characteristics
TAKEUP 0.511
(0.102)
BUYERController −0.467***
(0.166)
RATE (0.158)*
0.089
(Continued)
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Table 7
Continued
Rights Open Private Convertible
Variable Issues Offers Placements Bond Issues
Observations 393 124 276 58
R2 0.125 0.151 0.638 0.494
F 2.269 1.706 4.141 2.047
p-value <0.01 0.049 <0.01 0.032
Notes:
The table presents regression results where the dependent variable is the CAR over the 3-day window around
the issue announcement date, CAR[0, +2]. The other variables are defined in Table 3. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. We control for year and industry effects using year and industry dummy variables
in all the regressions.
The sample consists of 1,659 eligible seasoned issues by listed firms in China between 1991 and 2010.
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
day, and two days afterwards [0, +2]. We used abnormal returns over the [0, +2]
window as the dependent variable. The results are reported in Table 7. Compared
to Table 5, it appears that the variables featuring the pre-issue characteristics be-
come less significant in terms of the statistical significance and magnitude of the
coefficients for the three-day announcement period abnormal returns, except in
the case of ownership concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl index. On
the contrary, the variables featuring issue characteristics and, in particular, security-
specific features, generate more significant and stronger impacts on the three-day
announcement period abnormal returns in the majority of cases. Specifically, the size
of the offering (OFFER) and intended usage of issue proceeds (FUSETech, FUSEFixed,
FUSEIntra and FUSEDWC) stand out, especially in the case of rights issues and open
offers.
Our results consistently suggest that a temporary increase in firm value following
the announcement of an issue is associated with seasoned offerings in terms of the
size and scale of the issuance itself, and the subsequent usage of issue proceeds that
are intended for high-tech projects and fixed investments. Firm value experiences a
temporary reduction when funds are claimed for inter-firm use and debt and working
capital refinancing, reinforcing our prior results and remaining consistent with the
agency cost. In comparison to the five-day announcement period CARs as reported
in Table 5, the stronger impacts of rights take-up (TAKEUP) and targeted investors
(BUYER) substantiate our prior observations that the take-up of the rights by the
largest shareholders in a rights issue and the type of targeted buyers in a private
placement issue strong signals to the market when it forms a perception on the outlook
of issuers and hence the interests of investors. Overall, the apparent market price
movements in the three-day announcement period provide clear evidence to suggest
that the market is more reactive to the characteristics featuring the issuer and issue in
the first three days after the issue announcement.
Analysis of the Offer Period Window from the Day before the Offer Period to the Offer Expiry Date
[–A1, X0]. Evidence in the existing literature suggests that the offer period may
influence the specific impact of the occurrence of an event (e.g., Heinkel and
C© 2016 The Authors Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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Table 8
Regression Results of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs [–A1, X0]) in the
Offer Period by Issue Method
Rights Open Private Convertible
Variable Issues Offers Placements Bond Issues
Pre-issue characteristics
MBpre-issue −0.128 0.147** −0.158 0.146
(0.159) (0.062) (0.108) (0.138)
FCASTdiverg −0.213* 0.175* 0.285* 0.275**
(0.124) (0.102) (0.173) (0.137)
RUNUP −0.273** 0.253** 0.124 0.217**
(0.124) (0.119) (0.111) (0.104)
DIV 0.106 0.172* 0.283** 0.165
(0.113) (0.103) (0.139) (0.123)
Herf3 −0.269** −0.205* −0.327** −0.269
(0.136) (0.109) (0.159) (0.240)
SIZEpre-issue −0.238 −0.102* −0.257* 0.148
(0.178) (0.067) (0.146) (0.098)
Issue characteristics
DISC −0.394*** −0.207* −0.160* −0.174
(0.127) (0.108) (0.091) (0.135)
DISC × BUYERController −0.215**
(0.087)
DISC × BUYERInstitution 0.118**
(0.056)
UNDERStandby 0.169** 0.193* 0.384**
(0.071) (0.102) (0.185)
UNDERBest 0.183 0.127* 0.219**
(0.261) (0.069) (0.102)
UNDERFull −0.282* 0.142*
(0.162) (0.083)
AUDIT 0.273 0.258 0.114 0.062
(0.185) (0.196) (0.181) (0.057)
Size of offering −0.357** −0.336** 0.283** 0.232**
(0.168) (0.159) (0.121) (0.114)
FUSETech 0.524*** 0.411** 0.401** 0.438**
(0.196) (0.167) (0.176) (0.175)
FUSEFixed 0.491*** 0.415** 0.457** 0.505*
(0.183) (0.171) (0.206) (0.292)
FUSEIntra −0.512** −0.431** −0.511*** −0.426**
(0.253) (0.213) (0.162) (0.214)
FUSEDWC −0.435** −0.402** −0.457*** −0.404*
(0.182) (0.197) (0.135) (0.217)
DE −0.123* 0.238** 0.247** 0.311*
(0.071) (0.112) (0.124) (0.175)
Security-specific characteristics
TAKEUP 0.304***
(0.106)
BUYERController −0.278**
(0.132)
RATE 0.107
(0.102)
(Continued)
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Table 8
Continued
Rights Open Private Convertible
Variable Issues Offers Placements Bond Issues
Observations 390 135 285 56
R2 0.134 0.191 0.557 0.241
F 3.195 1.743 4.602 1.938
p-value <0.01 0.044 <0.01 0.048
Notes:
The table presents regression results where the dependent variable is the CAR over the window from the
date before the offer period to the offer expiry date, inclusive, CAR[−A1, X0]. The other variables are
defined in Table 3. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. We control for year and industry effects
using year and industry dummy variables in all the regressions.
The sample consists of 1,659 eligible seasoned issues by listed firms in China between 1991 and 2010.
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
Schwartz, 1986; and Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). We therefore perform further
tests on the offer period from the day before the offer period to the offer expiry date
[–A1, X0]. The mean (median) duration between the announcement date and the
offer expiry date in our sample is 30 (33) days. We use abnormal returns over the
[–A1, X0] window as the dependent variable. The results are reported in Table 8.
The majority of the results are qualitatively similar to those reported for the five-day
announcement CARs. Specifically, the coefficients of discount in the subscription price
(DISC), intended use of issue proceeds (FUSETech, FUSEFixed, FUSEIntra and FUSEDWC), size
of offering (OFFER), underwriting (UNDER), rights take-up (TAKEUP) and targeted
investors (BUYER) have the same sign with statistical significance, regardless of the
type of issuance. Auditing (AUDIT) and credit ratings (RATE) continue to appear
not to be statistically related to the CARs while analysts’ forecasts (FCASTdiverg) are
shown to be marginally related to the CARs in the plain equity offerings, providing
further support for the weak association between these variables and market returns as
identified in our primary analyses. The signs and significance of other variables, such
as price run-up, dividend payment practice, ownership concentration and debt-equity
ratio, remain largely unchanged in comparison with those from our primary model,
except in the case of the market-to-book ratio (MBpre-issue) and firm size (SIZEpre-issue).
We are therefore able to conclude that these results largely support our main
findings.
Further, we conduct diagnostic tests on multicollinearity in our regressions. The
presence of multicollinearity among independent variables can inflate standard
errors, which may result in less-efficient parameter estimates. To assess this possibility,
we conduct two tests of multicollinearity. First, we check correlations among the
independent variables using the correlation matrix. The values range between 0.02
and 0.67, with none exceeding the 0.80 threshold (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). Second,
we conduct a variance inflation factor (VIF) test. The values range between 1.25 and
3.49, and none is above the VIF threshold of 10 (O’Brien, 2007). These two tests justify
our confidence to the effect that multicollinearity is not a problem in our regressions.
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5. CONCLUSION
By reference to 1,659 seasoned issues over the period 1991–2010, we seek to identify
and analyse the factors which most powerfully explain the market reaction across the
full range of seasoned issuance methods used by Chinese companies. In so doing, we
increase insight into an emerging market’s progress towards pricing efficiency and also
into the factors that both assist and hinder such progress, paying due attention to the
activities of influential capital providers, market monitors and financial infrastructure
builders.
Our research questions and the attendant hypotheses yield instructive results. Our
results demonstrate that market reactions differ in ways that suggest a difference
between management’s internal assessment and the market’s assessment of stock
price across the different types of issuance. Open offers and notably rights offers are
unfavourably received. Convertible issues generate the most positive signals. Private
placements experience an unfavourable pre-announcement reaction, which contrasts
with the favourable reaction after the event. Our further investigation shows that
market reaction is related to factors specific to issuer and issue, as well as matters
specific to the context of China by reference to the period immediately surrounding
the issuance.
Our research recognises the progress of China towards greater market transparency
and more effective regulation, directed at inhibiting and remedying corporate and
individual misbehaviour. This regulation helps to generate information that can signal
the quality of a new issue. Despite such progress, public incredulity emerges strongly
from our further exploration of the drive behind the price movements surrounding
issuance. Such incredulity is reflected in the insignificance that the market attributes
to relatively unreliable criteria, namely analysts’ earnings forecasts, the potency of the
underwriting process, ratings and the quality of auditing services. Concerns such as
these are consistent with public scepticism with respect to both management and
their gatekeepers. These limitations, in turn, epitomise the constraints within the
existing system, where the prevention, control and resolution of market risks are
largely dependent on policy adjustments, covenants and other security safeguards.
The auditing and ratings professions remain regulated by the government, while the
utility of auditing services and credit ratings are not yet fully realised in this less than
efficient capital market. Their role does not appear to enjoy the degree of credibility
that applies in more mature regimes.
We have reported wide-ranging evidence that public incredulity is well founded.
Our results consistently reveal a lack, inadequacy or failure of investor-relevant market
mechanisms which would help to reduce informational asymmetries. Specifically, we
find evidence of interfering with the market pricing process and the exploitation of
resources by powerful, self-seeking control groupings. These occur both in the lead
up to and in the aftermath of a security offering and are designed to generate gains
at the expense of minority investors and other outsiders. Rights issues, open offers
and private placements are particularly affected by agency costs including those of
free cash flow. They carry relatively light contractual obligations and can be driven
by short-termism and perverse personal incentives. In a setting of informational
asymmetries, this degree of managerial discretion compounds a sense of uncertainty.
Such imperfections are aggravated by ineffective monitoring and lead to a material de-
parture from shareholder wealth maximisation. Powerful managers can and do abuse
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and misappropriate acquired funds. The active involvement of moneyed interests,
including the state, is a pervading influence. In the case of convertible bond issues,
credible regulatory discipline considerably reduces dysfunctional opportunities.
Centrally, the picture is of a market in progress, contending with agency costs,
incredulity and misbehaviour. Our salient conclusion, as reflected throughout the
results, is, accordingly, that market reaction betokens the evolving but still immature
state of China’s equity marketplace and the status of their imperfect corporate control.
Our findings carry policy implications. The identification of the distinctiveness,
impacts and threats of the forms of equity issuance suggests where remedial action
towards greater market efficiency might be directed. The rewards are more productive
capital allocation and apposite financing arrangements with sufficient protection of
investors. By way of future research, we hope that our work will stimulate enquiry into
its implications for China’s increasingly international equity issuance. New insights
stand to be gained into the perspicacity of the securities market and the quality of
information. Such further enquiry will help to meet the demands of the growing
number of sophisticated international investors in China with an interest in the local
sourcing of funds and funding partnerships. All of these phenomena will advance
China’s financial market in its progress towards greater efficiency, completeness and
maturity.
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